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The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?1
Stacey L. Dogan2 & Mark A. Lemley3
Trademark merchandising is big business. One marketing consultant estimated
the global market for licensing and marketing sports-related merchandise at $17 billion in
2001.4 The college-logo retail market was estimated at $3 billion in 2003.5 The 2002
Salt Lake Olympics generated $500 million in gross sales, and $34 million in licensing
revenues, from sale of “Olympics” attire.6 Even municipal police departments want a
piece of the action, applying to register their names as trademarks7 and demanding

1

© 2004 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley.

2

Associate Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law.

3

William H. Neukom Professor of Law, Stanford Law School; Director, Stanford
Program in Law, Science and Technology; of counsel, Keker & Van Nest LLP.
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Ardi Kolah, Maximising Revenue from Licensing and Merchandising, avail. at
http://www.sportbusinessassociates.com/sports_reports/Licensing%20and%20Merchandi
sing%20brochure.pdf (last visited July 26, 2004) (also reporting that $200 million of NFL
merchandise was sold in 2001, and that Manchester United earned $36 million from
global merchandising fees).
5

See Jeffrey Zaslow, Sports Fans Snap Up Souvenirs of Winners Beating Losers:
Mascots Boiled or Grilled?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2003, at A1. Another report recently
estimated that universities collect over $2.5 billion annually in revenues from officially
licensed products. Glenn Bacal & Sean Johnson, Collegiate Trademark Licensing: The
Basic Rules of the Game, published online by Office of General Counsel, Arizona State
University, at http://www.asu.edu/counsel/brief/trademark.html#N_2_ (last visited July
26, 2004). See C. Knox Withers, Sine Qua Non: Trademark Infringement, Likelihood of
Confusion, and the Business of Collegiate Licensing, 11 J. Intell. Prop. L. 421, 422
(2004) (suggesting $2.7 billion in collegiate revenue).
6

International Olympic Committee, Salt Lake 2002 Licensing, in Marketing Matters:
The
Olympic
Marketing
Newsletter,
p.
4,
avail.
at
http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_456.pdf
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See, e.g., United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Application Serial
Number 75,791,989 (filed Sept. 2, 1999) (application to register “LAPD” for use on
1

Merchandising Right Dogan & Lemley

DRAFT

royalties from television programs designed to evoke their image.8 Want to wear a hat
showing your support for your college or favorite baseball team? Want to wear a T-shirt
emblazoned with the word “Barbie” or the “Harley-Davidson” logo? You may have no
choice but to get an officially licensed piece of gear, at least if trademark owners have
their way.9

clothing and children’s clothing); United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark
Application Serial Number 76,342,567 (filed Nov. 28, 2001) (opposition pending as of
July 27, 2004) (application to register “NYPD” for use on clothing, housewares and
glasses, furniture, jewelry, keyrings, mousepads, and a host of other merchandise).
8

The New York and Los Angeles police departments have reportedly begun to demand
royalties for the use of the NYPD and LAPD names. According to a New York police
department spokesperson, “‘[w]e’re concerned about the marketing logo, what people do
with it, and what it indicates. If they do [use it] they either enter into an agreement and, if
they don’t, we sue.’” Bridget Byrne, Real Cops on TV Beat, Eonline, Aug. 5, 2002, avail.
at http://www.eonline.com/News/Items/0,1,10347,00.html (last visited July 27, 2004).
See also Dana Calvo & Richard Winton, Impersonating an Officer Could Be Costly in
Los Angeles; Unlike in the days of ‘Dragnet,’ two new shows may be charged licensing
fees to use the LAPD name, L.A. Times (Calendar), July 31, 2002, at 1 (“In a break with
tradition, City Atty. Rocky Delgadillo has asked the networks that air two new L.A.based police TV shows to pay licensing fees or risk legal action, saying the city in the
past has ‘basically been lazy about its intellectual property’ rights under trademark
law.”).
9

Trademark holders have not limited their zeal to merchandising cases, but behave
generally as though their rights to their brand names and logos are all but absolute. Some
trademark holders have attempted to sue anyone who makes use of the term, even in
contexts like parody or criticism that pose no threat of consumer confusion, the
traditional touchstone for trademark infringement claims. Trademark laws have been
used to preclude artists from painting in the same style as another, Romm Art Creations
Ltd. v. Simcha Int’l 786 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); to prevent an author from using
the term “Godzilla” in the title of his book about Godzilla, notwithstanding prominent
disclaimers, see Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1801 (C.D. Cal.
1998); to prevent a comic book from featuring a character known as Hell’s Angel, see
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 n.6 (9th Cir. 1993) (detailing the
trademark suit and the settlement); to prevent a satirical political advertisement from
using the “Michelob” trademark to help make its point, see Anheuser-Busch v. Balducci
Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994); to prevent a tractor manufacturer from making
fun of its competitor’s logo in an advertisement, see Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d
39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1994); to prevent a movie about a Minnesota beauty pageant from
using the title “Dairy Queens,” see American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., 35
F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998); to prevent a political satire of the O.J. Simpson case
2
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With this much money at stake, it’s no surprise that trademark holders demand
royalties for use of “their” marks on shirts, keychains, jewelry, and related consumer
products. After all, the value of these products comes largely from the allure of the
trademarks, and it seems only fair to reward the party that created that value…doesn’t it?
It turns out that the answer is more complicated than this intuitive account would
predict. Trademark law historically has existed primarily to protect against the consumer
deception that occurs when one party attempts to pass off its products as those of
another.10 From an economic and policy perspective, it is by no means obvious that

called “The Cat NOT in the Hat!”, see Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, 109
F.3d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1997); to prevent individuals from setting up web pages critical
of a company or product, see Ohio Art Co. v. Watts, No. 98 CV 7338, slip op. at 4 (N.D.
Ohio June 23, 1998); BellSouth Corp. v. Internet Classified of Ohio, No. 1:96-CV-0769CC, slip op. at 29-30 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 12, 1997); and to prevent a theme bar from calling
itself “The Velvet Elvis,” see Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir.
1998). In still other cases, plaintiffs have tried without success to prevent a variety of
artists, authors, political groups, news agencies, and others from using their trademarks.
See, e.g., Fox News Network v. Penguin Group, 2003 WL 23281520 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20,
2003) (attempt to prevent political humor book from using the phrase “fair and balanced”
in its title); Mastercard Int’l v. Nader 2000 Primary Committee, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (attempt to enjoin political speech in a presidential campaign that
parodied a trademark); American Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682
(N.D. Ohio 2002) (same); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302
(9th Cir. 1992) (attempt to prevent a newspaper from referring to the band “New Kids on
the Block” in a for-profit telephone poll); Lyons Partnership v. Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp.
2d 947 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (attempt to prohibit a comedy routine by the San Diego Chicken
in which it beat up a Barney character); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp.
931 (D.D.C. 1985) (attempt to prohibit the use of the term “Star Wars” to describe the
Reagan Administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative); Girl Scouts v. Personality Posters
Mfg., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (attempt to enjoin printing, distribution and
sale of a poster showing a pregnant girl in a Girl Scout uniform with the caption “Be
Prepared”). Those suits have been discussed in great deal elsewhere, and they will not
concern us further here. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the
Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687 (1999); Jessica Litman, Breakfast With
Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 Yale L.J. 1717 (1999); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 367 (1999).
10
The law also protects against confusion as to affiliation or sponsorship, but there, too,
the cause of action turns on the existence of confusion in the marketplace. See infra
3
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trademark holders should have exclusive rights over the sale of products that use marks
for their ornamental or “intrinsic” value, rather than as indicators of source or official
sponsorship.11 Trademark law seeks to promote, rather than hinder, truthful competition
in markets for products sought by consumers; if a trademark is the product, then giving
one party exclusive rights over it runs in tension with the law’s pro-competitive goals,
frequently without any deception-related justification.12 On the other hand, there may be
circumstances in which consumers expect that trademark holders sponsored or produced
products bearing their mark, in which case use of the mark by others – even as a part of a
product – might result in genuine confusion.13

At the very least, the fact that the

notes __-__ and accompanying text; J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks,
§ 18.39-18.40 (describing distinction between “source theory” of protection and “quality
theory” of protection). Federal dilution law, which protects against the “whittling away”
or tarnishment of a famous trademark’s distinctiveness, will rarely come into play in
merchandising cases. See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
11

See International Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981) (“It is not uncommon for a name or emblem
that serves in one context as a collective mark or trademark also to be merchandised for
its own intrinsic utility to consumers.”). Of course, trademarks sometimes serve a dual
function, as source identifier and as an integral aesthetic feature of the product. In these
cases, the interests of truthfulness and robust competition run into tension with one
another, and the solution becomes more challenging. We discuss such cases infra notes
__-__ and accompanying text.
12

Imagine, for example, that I am a Dallas Cowboys fan who wants to wear a Cowboys tshirt to show my support for the team. In that case, the trademark is an essential part of
the product I’m seeking – I am not looking to buy just any t-shirt, but a t-shirt with
COWBOYS as its defining feature. And I may or may not assume (or care) that the
Cowboys themselves had any relationship to the sale or manufacture of the shirt. See
Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandising of
Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 603, 604 (1984) (noting that items with logos
sell despite their high price relative to other items of similar quality). See generally Alex
Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 960, 961 (1993) (discussing the
“growing tendency to use trademarks not just to identify products but also to enhance or
adorn them, even to create new commodities altogether”).
13

See, e.g., National Football League Properties, Inc. v. New Jersey Giants, Inc., 637 F.
Supp. 507, 515 (D.N.J. 1986) (survey showed that up to 67% of football fans were
4
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trademark constitutes part of the product, rather than purely an indication of source,
complicates the analysis, raising a tension between the dual goals of trademark law.14
Given these complexities, together with the economic interests at stake, one might
expect that the law and practice of merchandising rights would be well-settled and reflect
a considered balancing of the interests of trademark holders and their competitors. In
reality, however, much of the multi-billion dollar industry of merchandise licensing has
grown around a handful of cases from the 1970s and 1980s that established
merchandising rights with little regard for the competing legal or policy concerns at
stake. Those cases are far from settled law – indeed, at least as many decisions decline to
give trademark owners the right to control sales of their trademarks as products. We
think it is high time to revisit that case law and to reconsider the theoretical justifications
for a merchandising right.
That review provides little support for trademark owners’ assumptions about
merchandising.

Doctrinally, the most broad-reaching merchandising cases – which

presumed infringement based on the public recognition of the mark as a trademark15 –
were simply wrong in their analysis of trademark infringement and have been specifically

confused as to the NFL’s sponsorship of GIANTS merchandise); cf. National Football
League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash.
1982) (up to 53.6% of consumers who saw defendant’s replicas of NFL jerseys believed
that the use required permission from the NFL).
14

See Denicola, supra note __, at 611; Bone, supra note __, [draft at 67-68].

15

“The certain knowledge of the buyer that the source and origin of the trademark
symbols were in the plaintiffs satisfies the requirements of the act.” Boston Professional
Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir.)
(emphasis added), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).

5
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rejected by subsequent decisions.16 Philosophically, even a merchandising right that
hinges on likelihood of confusion raises competition-related concerns that should affect
courts’ analysis of both the merits and appropriate remedies in merchandising cases.
Perhaps most importantly, recent Supreme Court case law suggests that, if it had the
opportunity to evaluate the merchandising theory (something it has never done), the
Court would deny the existence of such a right. Further, the Court would be right to do
so. When a trademark is sold, not as a source indicator, but as a desirable feature of a
product, competition suffers – and consumers pay – if other sellers are shut out of the
market for that feature.17
In Part I, we discuss the historic background and general principles of trademark
law, and trace the growth of the merchandising right theory from the 1970s through the
present, when the assumption of a merchandising right has become a standard part of
business practice. In Part II, we explore the legal and theoretical viability of such a
16

See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.

17

Robert Bone has aptly pointed out that product markets are hard to define in these
cases, and that competition won’t suffer if the trademark is competing as but one of many
competing ornamental features on the relevant product. But this seems unlikely in the
merchandising cases. A Dallas Cowboys fan won’t be satisfied with a Washington
Redskins T-shirt instead. If there is an identifiable product market, in the sense that the
trademark holder can command an above-market price because of the feature, the
Supreme Court has suggested that some remedy short of an injunction – such as a
disclaimer – is most appropriate to alleviate any confusion. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v.
National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154 (1989); cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
(“Doubtless a state may, in appropriate circumstances, require that goods, whether
patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other precautionary steps be taken to prevent
customers from being misled as to the source, … [b]ut because of the federal patent laws
a State may not … prohibit the copying of the article itself or award damages for such
copying.”); Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2001)
(asserting categorically that trademark protection may not extend to functional features
even if consumers associate them with a particular source). Even the courts that find
clear evidence of trademark confusion have not engaged in this second level of analysis.
6
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We find the basis for an absolute merchandising right quite weak.

The

justifications offered for a merchandising right tend to be circular, and to assume that
because it is possible to capture value by using a brand, the trademark owner must own
the right to control that value.

Making this assumption relegates competition and

consumer search costs to secondary status. While the question is not free from doubt,
and there are arguable justifications for limited protection in certain circumstances, the
concerns we discuss in this section do not justify a general merchandising right. Finally,
Part III considers how the Supreme Court would treat the merchandising theory if it were
presented with such a case. Recent Supreme Court trademark cases suggest that the
Court is quite concerned to protect competition against expansive readings of the
trademark right, an approach that suggests that it would not look kindly on the
merchandising theory.

I.

Origins of the Merchandising Right:

From Trademark as Brand to

Trademark as Product
A.

Trademarks, Confusion, and Competition

“Trademarks have existed for almost as long as trade itself.”18 From the earliest
days in which merchants made and sold goods for consumption by others, sellers have
used names and other symbols to indicate the source of their wares.19 These “marks”
18

Merges et al., supra note __, at 529; see also Frank Schechter, The Historical
Foundations of the Law Relating to Trademarks (1925) (tracing history of trademark
law to medieval times).
19

Merges et al., supra note __, at 529. We refer to “trademarks” in this paper, but the
7
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serve an important economic function: they enable sellers to develop reputations for
quality, and assure customers that products sold under the seller’s brand will live up to
that reputation.

Trademarks, in other words, provide convenient, truthful product

information in easily accessible form.20
To fulfill their informational objectives, trademarks require some form of legal
protection. A brand-based assurance of quality would mean nothing if imitators could
apply it to their own products and pass them off as having come from the trademark
holder. The result would be higher search costs for consumers and a disincentive to firms
to invest in goodwill and quality products and services.

Trademark law evolved

specifically to avoid this result. Doctrinally, trademark law prevents interlopers from
appropriating trademark holders’ goodwill by using their marks in a way that suggests
some association, affiliation, or sponsorship between the parties or their products.
Economically, trademark law reduces consumer search costs and facilitates investment in
goodwill by protecting the accuracy of trademark-related investments in advertising and
product quality.21

law and policies that we discuss apply equally to service marks, which are used to
distinguish the services of one party from those of another. See 45 U.S.C. § 1127.
20

For a more expansive discussion of the economics of trademark law, see Stacey L.
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 43
Hous. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2004); see also See William Landes & Richard Posner,
The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 167 (2003); William Landes &
Richard Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. & Econ. 265, 26870 (1987); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense,
108 Yale L.J. 1687, 1690-93 (1999) (describing economic justifications for trademarks
and advertising); Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, __ VA. L.
REV. __ (forthcoming 2004) (draft at 9-12). The informational function of trademarks is
particularly important for products whose salient characteristics are not evident upon
inspection. See, e.g., Bone, supra, at [draft at 11-12].
21

Not all commentators view the by-products of trademark law as desirable.
8
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While the reduction of consumer search costs and the encouragement of goodwill
investment represent critical intermediate objectives of the trademark system, neither of
these goals is an end in and of itself. The law reduces consumer search costs in order to
facilitate the functioning of a competitive marketplace. Informed consumers will make
better-informed purchases, which will increase their overall utility and push producers to
develop better quality products.22

Trademark law, then, aims to promote more

competitive markets by improving the quality of information in those markets.23
The primacy of competition in trademark law stands in stark contrast with other
areas of intellectual property law, which insulate creators from competition in order to
encourage future acts of creation.24 Copyright and patent law offer creators exclusive

particular, an influential scholarly movement in the early 1900s criticized trademark law
for its tendency to encourage wasteful expenditures on advertisements that resulted in
product differentiation and noncompetitive pricing. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Jr.,
Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 Yale
L.J. 1165, 1169 (1948) (“Considering the economic welfare of the community as a
whole, to use up part of the national product persuading people to buy product A rather
than product B appears to be a waste of resources.”); see also Lunney, Trademark
Monopolies, supra note __.
22

Indeed, classical economics requires fully informed buyers and sellers as a condition
for a perfectly competitive economy. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Shaping Competition
on the Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing Information?, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1965,
1968 (2000) (describing conditions for perfectly competitive market).
23

Cf. Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 379 (2d Cir. 1997)
(“the Lanham Act must be construed in light of a strong federal policy in favor of
vigorously competitive markets, which is exemplified by the Sherman Act and other antitrust laws”).

24

See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (setting forth exclusive rights of copyright holders); 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 (defining exclusive rights of patent holders). The exclusive rights offered by
copyright and patent law do not necessarily give the rights-holder economic power in any
relevant market, because in most cases, the creator’s work faces competition from other
products that serve a similar market demand. See, e.g., 1 Herbert Hovenkamp et al., IP
and Antitrust § 4.2 (2004 ed.) (pointing out that most patents and copyrights do not
confer market power in a relevant market). Nonetheless, the laws give rights-holders the
9
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economic rights to cure the presumed market failure that would result if copiers could
replicate expressive works and inventions without incurring the costs of their
development.25

As such, these regimes were created specifically to encourage the

creation of intrinsically valuable products. Trademark law quite consciously does not
serve this goal; both its philosophy and its structure eschew the notion that trademark
rights should serve as either an inducement or a reward for the creation of product
features that have inherent – as opposed to source-identifying – value.26
While the reach of trademark law has expanded over the centuries, the law has

ability to exclude others from copying product features that consumers may demand for
their inherent qualities. And if they succeed in creating incentives, it is because they
permit creators to price in excess of marginal cost.
25

See Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in
Intellectual Property, 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. 853 (1992).
26

See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003)
(“‘The Lanham Act,’ we have said, ‘does not exist to reward manufacturers for their
innovation in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its
period of exclusivity.’”) (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532
U.S. 23, 34 (2001)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (prohibiting the registration of any
trademark that “comprises any matter that, as a whole, is functional”); Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (“It is the province of patent law, not
trademark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new
product designs or functions for a limited time, … after which competitors are free to use
the innovation.”). Of course, distinguishing between the inherent and source-identifying
functions of a particular product feature can be daunting. See, e.g., Bone, supra note __,
at [draft at 80-81] (distinguishing between consumption value and source-identification
function of particular product features).
The structure of trademark law is also ill-suited to protection of appealing product
features. Unlike copyright and patent rights, which expire after a defined term, trademark
law provides protection for as long as the mark serves as a source-indicator. As a result,
when trademark law extends to product features that have intrinsic value, the trademark
holder can obtain a potentially perpetual monopoly over those product features. Cf.
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164-65 (“If a product’s functional features could be used as
trademarks, … a monopoly over such features could be obtained without regard to
whether they qualify as patents and could be extended forever (because trademarks may
be renewed in perpetuity).”).

10
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generally maintained its emphasis on promoting linguistic clarity and preventing
confusion and misinformation in the sales process.27 Initially, trademark law applied
only to word marks, and conferred only the right to prevent competitors from using the
mark on directly competing goods.28 Over time, however, trademark law has expanded
both in subject matter and in scope. Federal trademark and unfair competition law now
extend to product packaging, logos, and even the shape and features of products if
consumers view these features as source-indicators.29 And often consumers do use these
product features to identify source, at least with respect to certain well-known products:
a chocolate aficionado, for example, would recognize immediately the shape and
packaging of a Hershey’s KissTM, and would expect such a morsel to have the distinctive
flavor associated with Hershey’s.
Just as trademark subject matter has expanded, so has the range of uses that can

27

Initially, the law protected only against deception as to “the physical source or origin of
the product or service with which the trademark was used.” J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 18:39, at p. 18-60 (1999). Over time, however, the
courts recognized that trademarks could indicate quality as well as source, and extended
protection to marks, such as franchise names, that indicated some consistent level of
quality products or services. Id. at § 18:40. Further, the nationalization and
internationalization of sales means that consumers can recognize and rely upon brands
even if they don’t know the actual source of the goods, so long as they understand that
goods with the brand come from a consistent source. The law changed in 1984 to take
account of this development. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (amending genericness rule to
overrule Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 682 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir.
1982)). In his treatise, McCarthy characterizes the shift as a move from a “source
theory” of trademark protection toward a “quality theory.” Id.
More recently, Congress created a new right for owners of famous marks, to
prevent uses that “dilute” the distinctiveness of their marks. This right, too, finds some
basis in the search costs rationale. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks
and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 43 Hous. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2004)
28

Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-13 (1916).

29

McCarthy, supra note __, at § 1:17.

11
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subject one to an infringement or unfair competition claim.30 From its origins – in which
infringement required the use of a similar mark on a directly competing product –
trademark law has expanded to control uses of a trademark on different but related goods
“such that the ordinary buyer would be likely to think there was some connection or
sponsorship between the producers or sellers of goods bearing a similar mark, even
though the goods were non-competitive.”31

Trademark law, then, comes into play

whenever consumers would presume affiliation, sponsorship, or other association
between the trademark holder and another party selling goods under a similar mark.32
The law no longer limits itself to cases of “passing off” goods as manufactured or
produced by the trademark holder.33
In the abstract, neither of these expansions departs from trademark law’s core
focus on facilitating the flow of truthful information and reducing consumer search costs.
If consumers in fact perceive distinctive packaging as an indication of the qualities or
source of the goods inside, then allowing trademark holders to prevent others from using
30

The Lanham Act includes separate provisions for “infringement” of registered marks,
on the one hand, and unfair competition through the use of confusingly similar symbols
or devices, on the other. Compare 45 U.S.C. § 1114 (providing a cause of action for
infringement of registered marks) with 45 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (setting forth the standards
for an unfair competition claim). For all practical purposes, however, the standards for
infringement and unfair competition are identical, both turning on the existence of
confusion as to affiliation, source, or sponsorship. The only significant difference for
infringement purposes is the burden of proof: registered marks are presumed valid.

31

McCarthy, supra note __, at § 24:2; see also Bone, supra note __, at [draft at 55-68].

32

Congress codified this expansion in the Lanham Act, providing a cause of action
against any person who falsely implies an “affiliation, connection or association” with a
trademark holder, or causes confusion “as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities….” 45 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
33

More recently, Congress has extended federal trademark law to protect famous marks
against the dilution of their distinctiveness. See infra notes __-__ and accompanying
text.
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the same packaging will help consumers cheaply and easily to identify products from a
consistent source. Similarly, if consumers view a mark as an indicator of consistent
product quality, particularly in an economic environment in which companies regularly
sell a large range of goods, it makes sense to enjoin confusing uses of the mark by sellers
of related products, since consumers will suffer if their quality expectations are
inaccurate.34
In combination, however, extending legal protection both to trade dress and to
confusion based on sponsorship raises unique competition-related concerns that
complicate the effect of such protection on the competitive process. As trademark law
begins to protect not only the brand name for a product, but the product itself, it risks
hindering competition rather than promoting it. If a manufacturer could use trademark
law to prevent the copying of features that made its product superior in form or
craftsmanship, consumers would suffer, because competitors could never enter the
market for those features and drive prices down.35 The move from protecting trademark
as label to trademark as mixed label-and-product, then, can have an ambiguous effect on
competition:

while it can potentially reduce search costs by facilitating product

identification and reducing marketplace confusion, it can also directly hinder competition
“on the merits” in the sale of products.

34

This harm has both short-term and long-term dimensions. In the short term, consumers
may suffer if the quality of a product fails to meet their expectations. Over the long term,
if consumers learn that they cannot count on the trademark as a reliable indicator of
quality, they will have to engage in more costly means of acquiring information about the
quality of products. This latter effect represents the type of increase in consumer search
costs that the trademark laws seek to avoid.

35

See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2001).
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Trademark law has so far accommodated these competing concerns in two ways.
First, with respect to product configuration (as opposed to packaging) trade dress, the
Supreme Court recently clarified that protection applies only to features that actually, and
demonstrably, indicate source to consumers. To claim trademark protection for a product
feature, the claimant must prove that the feature has acquired secondary meaning, “which
occurs when, ‘in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a [mark] is to
identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.’”36 If a product feature
has achieved this status, the search costs rationale argues in favor of trademark
protection, at least in the absence of some countervailing consideration.37 Second, even if
a product feature has acquired secondary meaning, the “functionality” doctrine precludes
protection if “its use as a mark would permit one competitor (or a group) to interfere with
legitimate (non-trademark-related) competition through actual or potential exclusive use
of an important product ingredient.”38 The Supreme Court views functionality as the
ultimate guardian of marketplace competition, and has, of late, repeatedly emphasized its
significance.39 In tandem, the secondary meaning requirement and functionality doctrine

36

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 595 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (quoting Inwood
Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 851, n.11 (1982)). The trademark holder must
also identify with particularity the features for which it seeks protection. Cf. Maharishi
Hardy Blechman Ltd. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 292 F. Supp. 2d 535, 549-50
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting trade dress claim based on product line that reflected
inconsistency in product features).
37

In other words, when a product feature has acquired secondary meaning, there is a risk
that use of the feature by other sellers could confuse consumers as to source or
sponsorship.
38

Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170.

39

See, e.g., Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164 (“The functionality doctrine prevents trademark
law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from instead
inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product
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ensure that trademark law limits feature-based competition only when consumer
expectations suggest that confusion is likely, and even then the primacy of competition
requires that competitors have access to product features that are necessary to a
competitive product market. We mention them here for two reasons: to emphasize that
trademark law should have nothing to say about behavior that does not tamper with the
clarity of information about who makes or sponsors products; and to reiterate that the law
values such clarity only as long as it serves to promote a more competitive marketplace.

B.

The Merchandising Right and Trademark as Product

Against this backdrop, the so-called “merchandising right” is something of an
anomaly. When fans buy t-shirts with the name of their school, team, or rock band, they
are almost always buying a product bearing an established mark entitled to some form of
trademark protection.40 But the mark in these cases is rarely serving the traditional
function of a trademark. Rather than indicating something to the consumer about the
feature.”); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2001)
(“The Lanham Act … does not protect trade dress in a functional design simply because
an investment has been made to encourage the public to associate a particular functional
feature with a single manufacturer or seller.”); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 775
(the functionality doctrine “serves to assure that competition will not be stifled by the
exhaustion of a limited number of trade dresses”).
40

Typically, the mark has acquired trademark status through use in connection with some
other primary activity, such as baseball entertainment services, educational services, or
music performance. As such, the mark serves as a source-indicator with respect to these
services, and the trademark holder would have the right to prevent use of the mark on
similar services or products.
By contrast, in Japan and increasingly in the United States people will sometimes
buy T-shirts that display either an invented logo (one that doesn’t in fact brand a real
product) or a random collection of words. The case for merchandising protection for
such invented logos is even weaker than for established trademarks.
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source or sponsorship of a product, the mark is the product, or at least is a critical part of
what makes the product attractive.

While the mark may, on occasion, also signal

something about the source or sponsorship of the shirt, its function transcends the role of
a traditional trademark.

Merchandising cases therefore represent a kind of hybrid

between product configuration and word-based trademark infringement claims: they
generally involve protected marks, but the marks are more product features than brands.
For years, most trademark holders did not complain about such uses of their
marks by unaffiliated parties. The Boston Athletic Association, which had operated the
Boston Marathon since 1897, waited until the mid-1980s to object to the sale of
BOSTON MARATHON merchandise by third parties.41 The University of Pittsburgh
acquiesced in Champion Products’ sale of PITT merchandise from 1936 until 1981, when
it filed a trademark infringement suit.42 It appears that the 1970s and 1980s represented
an era of awakening, in which trademark holders came to realize the economic value of
their marks on merchandise and the revenues that they could earn through licensing if
they were entitled to control the use of those marks.43

In the decades since, the

awakening has only spread, to the point at which even municipal police departments are
41

See Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1989).

42

See University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 464 (D. Pa.
1982) (noting that University of Pittsburgh failed to object to unlicensed sales of PITT
merchandise from 1936 until 1980); see also University Book Store et al. v. Board of
Regents of University of Wisconsin, 1994 WL 747886, at *10 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (noting
that University of Wisconsin had, “over the years, tolerated sales and advertising of
goods, including clothing, bearing the marks” it sought to register in 1988).

43

Some of the sports leagues may have come to the realization a bit earlier. The National
Football League, for example, established NFL Properties in 1963 expressly “to act as a
licensing representative for the trademarks and other commercial identifications of the
member clubs.” National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear,
Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 655 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
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entering the world of trademark licensing.44

C.

The Shaky Foundations of the Merchandising Right

What explains the explosive growth of the licensing market for trademark
merchandise? The answer appears to lie in a handful of judicial decisions from the 1970s
and 1980s.
1975 was a banner year in the law of trademark merchandising. During that year,
both the National Hockey League and the National Football League persuaded courts to
enjoin the sale of unlicensed emblems bearing the marks of their member teams.45 While
the Fifth Circuit NHL case received the most attention, the Illinois state court decision in
the football case offered a more plausible – but more limited – theoretical justification for
its extension of trademark doctrine.46 Together, the cases likely fueled the interest among
trademark holders in obtaining royalties from the sale of their marks.
In Boston Hockey v. Dallas Cap & Emblem,47 the National Hockey League and
several of its member clubs brought suit to enjoin the manufacture and sale of emblems
bearing their trademarks.48 The district court found no infringement, reasoning that

44

See supra __-__.

45

National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Consumer Enterprises, Inc., 327 N.E.2d
242, 247 (Ill. App. 1975); Boston Hockey v. Emblem Cap, 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir.
1975).
46

See infra note __ and accompanying text.

47

510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).

48

Id. at 1008.
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consumers did not necessarily expect an affiliation between the emblem seller and the
hockey teams,49 and that in any event, the functionality doctrine required competitors to
have access to trademarks that served as ornamental features on products.50
The Fifth Circuit’s reversal broke new theoretical ground and effectively wrote
the confusion requirement out of the Lanham Act. While conceding the centrality of
confusion to trademark infringement claims,51 the court found the district court’s concept
of confusion unduly narrow:
It can be said that the public buyer knew that the emblems portrayed the
teams' symbols. Thus, it can be argued, the buyer is not confused or
deceived. This argument misplaces the purpose of the confusion
requirement. The confusion or deceit requirement is met by the fact that
the defendant duplicated the protected trademarks and sold them to the
public knowing that the public would identify them as being the teams'
trademarks. The certain knowledge of the buyer that the source and origin
of the trademark symbols were in plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the
act. The argument that confusion must be as to the source of the
manufacture of the emblem itself is unpersuasive, where the trademark,
originated by the team, is the triggering mechanism for the sale of the
emblem.52
The court, in other words, presumed actionable confusion based solely on the

49

Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 360 F. Supp.
459, 462-63 (D. Tex. 1973) (“The test is not whether the products in question are
duplications of their marks, but whether the defendant’s use of the mark would mislead
the public as to the source of the goods.”), rev’d, 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975).

50

Id. at 463; see also id. at 464 (“The marks have achieved intrinsic value to a segment of
the consuming public which may be attracted to their aesthetic features and to their
characteristics as a patch to be used on apparel or for collecting. … In this area of the
economy the protection of trademark law must give way to the public policy favoring
free competition.”). Recognizing, however, the possibility that at least some consumers
might assume that the NHL had officially licensed the products, the court entered a
limited injunction requiring a disclaimer of any association between the manufacturer and
the NFL or its teams. Id. at 465.

51

510 F.2d 1012.

52

Id. (emphasis added).
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consumer’s mental association between the trademark and the trademark holder.
Likelihood of confusion, in the Boston Hockey definition, turns not on whether
consumers have any misperception about where a product comes from or whether the
trademark holder has endorsed it. On this approach, confusion exists by definition if the
trademark comprises “the triggering mechanism” in the sale.53
What justified this shift in trademark theory? Without specifically addressing the
district court’s analysis of functionality, and while acknowledging that its decision “may
slightly tilt the trademark laws from the purpose of protecting the public to the protection
of business interests of plaintiffs,” the court pointed to “three persuasive points” in
support of its decision.
First, the major commercial value of the emblems is derived from the
efforts of plaintiffs. Second, defendant sought and would have asserted, if
obtained, an exclusive right to make and sell the emblems. Third, the sale
of a reproduction of the trademark itself on an emblem is an accepted use
of such team symbols in connection with the type of activity in which the
business of professional sports is engaged.54
The second point is irrelevant,55 and the third circular:

it amounts to arguing that

allowing trademark holders to claim a royalty on merchandise bearing their marks is
desirable because it’s what trademark holders already do.56 None of these explanations
even attempts to address the effect of such a right on consumers, on competitors, or on

53

Id.

54

510 F.2d at 1011.

55

Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 & n.18 (1994) (fact that
party had unsuccessfully requested a license to use a copyrighted work should not weigh
against fair use when the work is later used without permission).

56

We address the “existing practices” argument in more detail infra note __-__ and
accompanying text.
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the competitiveness of the marketplace as a whole – i.e., on the core values of trademark
law. The court’s justification for departing from those core values quickly collapses to its
first point – defendants are capturing commercial value that ought to belong to the
plaintiffs. The decision – and indeed the merchandising theory altogether – finds its
normative justification in an instinctive reaction against “unjust enrichment.”
Subsequent decisions and commentaries have condemned the Boston Hockey
court’s approach to likelihood of confusion in merchandise cases.57

Rather than

presuming confusion based on the use of a known trademark, many if not most courts
have required trademark holders to establish a genuine likelihood that the use will
confuse consumers as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation.58

Without proof that

57

See, e.g., United States v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 2000) (criticizing
Boston Hockey for its “reli[ance] upon a novel and overly broad conception of the rights
that a trademark entails”); International Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co.,
633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980) (describing decision as “an extraordinary extension of
the protection heretofore afforded trademark owners”); Bi-Rite Enters, Inc. v. Button
Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1193-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); See Brown & Denicola at 691 (7th
ed. 1998), noting that “Boston Hockey has been distinguished and limited in later
decisions for its loose interpretation of the confusion requirement”); Withers, supra note
__, at 453; Mark A. Kahn, May the Best Merchandise Win: The Law of Non-Trademark
Uses of Sports Logos, 14 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 283, 302-09 (2004).
58

See, e.g., University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 464 (D. Pa.
1982); International Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir.
1980); National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F.
Supp. 651, 659 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (“Likelihood of confusion in a sponsorship context
focuses on the product bearing the allegedly infringing marks and asks whether the public
believes the product bearing the mark originates with or is somehow endorsed or
authorized by the plaintiff.”). The Fifth Circuit itself subsequently adopted this standard
and thus narrowed, at least implicitly, the Boston Hockey holding. See Supreme
Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d 1079, 1082 (5th
Cir. 1982); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368,
388 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Trademark infringement occurs only when the use sought to be
enjoined is likely to confuse purchasers with respect to such things as the product’s
source, its endorsement by the plaintiff, or its connection with the plaintiff.”).
The Restatement of Unfair Competition also impliedly rejects the merchandising
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consumers view a given use of a trademark as an indication of official sponsorship, these
claims generally fail.

In Board of Governors of University of North Carolina v.

Helpingstine,59 for example, the court rejected UNC’s infringement suit against a t-shirt
manufacturer, based on a failure of proof that consumers viewed the shirts as sponsored
by the university:
Given that there is a distinct possibility that individuals who buy products
from Johnny T-Shirt do not base their decision upon whether the product is
sponsored or endorsed by UNC-CH and that plaintiffs bear the burden of
establishing likelihood of confusion, the court holds that UNC-CH must meet its
burden by showing more than simply the identity of the marks. Instead, it must
provide evidence establishing that individuals do make the critical distinction as
to sponsorship or endorsement, or direct evidence of actual confusion.60
Other courts applying the confusion-based standard have similarly rejected the trademark
holder’s claims.61
Of the post-Boston Hockey courts that have found a likelihood of confusion in
merchandising cases, most have based their decisions not on a new general right to
theory, stating in §25(1) that “one may be subject to liability under the law of trademarks
for the use of a designation that resembles the trademark of another without proof of a
likelihood of confusion only under an applicable antidilution statute.” Comment i. then
goes on to state that “use . . . as mere ornamentation on the subsequent user’s goods does
not dilute the distinctiveness of the mark by associating the mark as a symbol of
identification with different goods or services.”
59

714 F. Supp. 167 (M.D.N.C. 1989).

60

Id. at 173 (citing McCarthy, supra note __, at ¶ 24:3 at 172).

61

See, e.g., Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow Girls, 676 F.2d at 1083; University of
Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 464 (W.D. Pa. 1982); International
Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980); Board of
Governors of University of North Carolina v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 173
(M.D.N.C. 1989).
In a related context, a court recently refused to enjoin the sale of logos themselves
as clip art. See Medic Alert Foundation v. Corel Corp., 43 F. Supp. 2d 933 (N.D. Ill.
1999). The court rejected the claim based on the absence of consumer confusion.
Professor McCarthy endorses this result. McCarthy, supra note __, at 25:52.1.
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prevent unjust enrichment or control merchandising, but on evidence that the public
actually believed the trademark holder licensed the defendant’s products.62 This form of
“sponsorship confusion” was the theoretical basis for the NFL’s Illinois emblem suit in
1975. While the Illinois court was less than exacting in its analysis of the facts,63 later
rulings in NFL suits have turned upon surveys and other evidence indicating the
widespread belief that team-related jerseys are officially licensed by the League.64
Despite a general move away from its broadest reading, however, the residual
effects of Boston Hockey remain, and later decisions sometimes fall back upon its
conclusory language about the right of a trademark holder to control any uses that benefit
from its mark’s goodwill.65 Others, apparently moved by sympathy for the trademark

62

Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG v. Universal Brass, Inc., 1995 WL 420816, at *3 (W.D.
Wash. 1995) (concluding that “actual confusion as to authorization, coupled with
[defendant’s] use of the [trademark registration] symbol, make it such that no rational
trier of fact could find that confusion as to Porsche’s sponsorship is unlikely”); National
Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 659
(W.D. Wash. 1982).
63

National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Consumer Enterprises, Inc., 327 N.E.2d
242, 246-47 (Ill. App. 1975) (basing likelihood of confusion conclusion upon the NFL’s
extensive licensing practices, through which “the buying public has come to associate the
trademark with the sponsorship of the NFL or of the particular team involved”).
64

See, e.g., National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc.,
532 F. Supp. 651, 659 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (“Just as the relevant inquiry for the
establishment of likelihood of confusion in a sponsorship context is the belief that
sponsorship or authorization was granted, the inquiry should be the same in order to
establish secondary meaning.”).
65

See, e.g., Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989)
(“Defendants’ shirts are clearly designed to take advantage of the Boston Marathon and
to benefit from the good will associated with its promotion by plaintiffs. Defendants thus
obtain a ‘free ride’ at plaintiffs’ expense.”); University of Georgia Athletic Ass’n v.
Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (enjoining use of BATTLIN’ BULLDOG
beer, when “the confusion stems not from the defendant’s unfair competition with the
plaintiff’s products, but from the defendant’s misuse of the plaintiff’s reputation and
good will as embodied in the plaintiff’s mark”); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724
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holder, nominally focus on a likelihood of confusion but stretch the facts or adopt
unsupported assumptions to conclude that consumers presume an association between the
trademark holder and goods bearing its mark and will therefore be confused.66
These decisions, and the general uncertainty in the legal landscape surrounding
merchandising rights, have no doubt contributed to trademark holders’ intuition in favor
of a licensing right. But they offer a rather slender reed on which to build an entire new
jurisprudence. A closer look at these cases suggests that trademark holders may be
relying on a proverbial house of cards. The fact that courts are at best evenly split as to
whether a merchandising right even exists, and even more dubious of its existence in the
absence of consumer confusion,67 makes it all the more surprising that trademark owners,

F.2d 327, 334 (2d Cir. 1983) (“It is because of that association, the identification of the
toy car with its source, Warner’s television series, that the toy car is bought by the public.
That is enough” for an infringement claim against an imitator.) (emphasis in original);
Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Sethscot Collection, 2000 WL 34414961, at *9 (“the confusion
factor is met where, as here, the registered mark … is the triggering mechanism for the
sale of the product”); cf. University Book Store et al. v. Board of Regents of University
of Wisconsin, 1994 WL 747886, at *8 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (criticizing the “antiquated view
of trademarks as harmful monopolies which must be rigorously confined within
traditional bounds” as “outmoded and not in accordance with more recent cases”).
66

See Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Given the
undisputed fact that (1) defendants intentionally referred to the Boston Marathon on its
shirts, and (2) purchasers were likely to buy the shirts precisely because of that reference,
we think it fair to presume that purchasers are likely to be confused about the shirt’s
source or sponsorship.”); cf. University Book Store et al. v. Board of Regents of
University of Wisconsin, 1994 WL 747886, at *10 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (acknowledging
university’s decades-long failure to police the use of its mark on merchandise, and
nonetheless concluding that “it is undisputed that, to a significant portion of the relevant
public, the subject marks identify applicant as the primary source of its educational and
entertainment services and as the secondary source of the apparel imprinted with such
marks”) (emphasis added).
67

This doctrinal disagreement is not limited to the United States. In Arsenal Football
Club v. Reed, [2003] EWCA Civ. 96 (Ct. App. Chanc.), the European Court of Justice
established a merchandising right, holding that if both the marks and the goods sold were
identical it did not matter whether consumers were confused. The U.K. courts refused to
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retail businesses and even government officials simply assume the existence of such a
right.68

II.

Does the Merchandising Right Make Sense?
In this section, we consider the pros and cons of a broad merchandising right, and

conclude that there is no theoretical and little practical justification for such a right. At
best, trademark owners are entitled to prevent a limited range of merchandising uses that
are likely to confuse consumers.

A.

Goodwill and Free Riding

To begin, we will consider the theory of unjust enrichment or free riding that
seems to underlie the instincts of courts and trademark owners in many of the
merchandising cases. Advocates of the merchandising right justify it by referring to the
“free riding” that would occur if competitors could sell T-shirts using their logos. Those
competitors would be “trading on their goodwill,” and therefore presumably taking
something that ought as a matter of right to belong to the trademark owner.69 Courts

give effect to this judgment, however, ruling that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the
ECJ and that Reed’s sale of merchandise featuring the logo of the Arsenal football team
did not infringe Arsenal’s trademark.
68

See, e.g., James Cyphers, Companies Join Police in Pursuing T-Shirt Bootleggers,
Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 1991, at B2 (noting law enforcement actions against the sale of tshirts bearing trademarks and logos).
69

Jerre B. Swann & Theodore H. Davis Jr., Dilution, An Idea Whose Time Has Gone:
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sometimes talk loosely about appropriation of a trademark owner’s goodwill as the harm
to be prevented.70

In a related vein, Robert Denicola concludes that while a

merchandising right doesn’t fit well with trademark theory, the trademark owner has a
better claim to own the right than anyone else, and so deserves the right to control
merchandising using the trademark.71
These justifications are circular and ultimately empty.

Denicola’s analysis

presumes that someone must control this particular segment of the market. If we start our
analysis on that basis, it might make sense that the trademark owner is the logical entity
to exercise that control.72 But there is no reason to start from that presumption. We do
not assume that the trademark owner has the right to control parodies, or criticism, or
referential uses of the mark, or “uses” of a mark based on proximity.73 Trademark rights
have never given exclusive rights to control all uses of a mark. They have traditionally
given trademark owners the right only to prevent uses that confuse consumers, or blur the

Brand Equity as Protectable Property, the New/Old Paradigm, 1 J. Intell. Prop. L. 219,
238 (1994); Marlene B. Hanson & W. Casey Walls, Protecting Trademark Good Will:
The Case for a Federal Standard of Misappropriation, 81 Trademark Rptr. 480 (1991).
Many would trace this notion back to Frank Schechter, who conceived of trademarks as
property rights long before the notion was in judicial vogue. See Frank I. Schechter, The
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 819 (1927).
70

See, e.g., Beacon Mutual Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins., 376 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004); 1-800
Contacts v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Brockum Co. v.
Blaylock, 729 F. Supp. 438, 444 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (the “unlicensed use of the Rolling
Stones’ name” on t-shirts “would permit the defendant to reap where it had not sown”).
71

See Denicola, supra note __, at 640-41.

72

Even then this conclusion is not inexorable. Since consumers are the ultimate
intended beneficiaries of trademark protection, one could argue that it made more sense
to vest such a right in consumers, not producers.
73

For a discussion of non-trademark uses that are protected, see Dogan & Lemley,
supra note __, at __.
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distinctive significance of the mark, in order to minimize consumer search costs and
facilitate the functioning of large-scale markets. Uses of a mark that don’t raise these
concerns are reserved to the free market. The merchandising theory expands the rights of
trademark owners, giving them a new form of control over uses of “their” mark at the
expense of the background norm of competition.74

That expansion requires some

justification; in a market economy it is not reasonable to simply assume that someone
must own the right to compete in particular ways.75
This justification cannot be found in the notion of “free riding” or appropriation
of goodwill. Those notions too assume rather than demonstrate that someone is entitled
to own a right on which another might free ride.76 We don’t speak of newspapers as “free
riding” on trade names when they report news about the companies that use those names,
even though one can imagine a world in which the trademark owner licensed such use.
Similarly, we don’t speak of gas stations as free riding on competitors when they locate
across the street from that competitor, or of stores free riding on the anchor tenant of a
shopping mall by deciding to lease space in that mall. Companies engaging in all these
activities are free riding in some sense; they are using the name or reputation of another

74

As Ralph Brown put it, “competition is copying.” Ralph S. Brown, The Joys of
Copyright, 30 J. Copyright Soc’y 477, 481 (1983). See also Robert C. Denicola,
Freedom to Copy, 108 Yale L.J. 1661, 1661 (1999) (“laws that restrain copying . . .
restrain competition”).
75

See generally Peter Jaffey, Merchandising and the Law of Trade Marks, 3 INTELL.
PROP. Q. 240, 240-42 (1998) (noting that trademark law does not support a general
merchandising right).
76

Mark Lemley deconstructs the idea of free riding as a justification for an intellectual
property regime in Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding
(working paper 2004).
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company without paying. But the world is full of free riding.77 The question is whether a
particular type of conduct causes the kind of harm that trademark law ought to address.78
Simply announcing that a particular use of a trademark is an improper appropriation of
the trademark owner’s goodwill assumes the conclusion.79
The problem is not simply that we can’t find an affirmative reason to grant
trademark owners a merchandising right.

Doing so can actually interfere with the

fundamental goals of trademark law, as we discuss in the next section.

77

See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 Va. L. Rev. 149, 167 (1992) ("A culture could not exist if all
free riding were prohibited within it."); see also TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (“In general, unless an intellectual property right
such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying. … Allowing
competitors to copy will have salutary effects in many instances.”).
78

Certainly, free riding may sometimes threaten incentives or distort information in the
marketplace. But the structure of our intellectual property system already addresses these
forms of free riding, in a way that strikes a balance between incentive and competition.
Patent and copyright laws, for example, insulate creators from copying creative works or
inventions for a defined term, in order to provide them with an incentive to create works
that ultimately are relegated to the public. Trademark law targets free riding only if it
misleads consumers and thus distorts information in the marketplace. While one might
imagine an argument that a merchandising right helps to provide financial support for
trademark holders’ primary activity, such an argument turns on unfounded assumptions
that such support is necessary and appropriate, and that information-based trademark law
is the best vehicle to provide it. See infra note __.
79

Rochelle Dreyfuss has derided such assumptions as “if value, then right.” Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397, 405 (1990). See also Felix Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 815
(1935) ("The vicious circle inherent in this reasoning is plain. It purports to base legal
protection upon economic value, when, as a matter of actual fact, the economic value of a
sales device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally protected."); William P.
Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 Memphis St. U. L. Rev.
199, 203-04 (1991).
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Harms of a Broad Merchandising Right

Why not grant trademark owners a right to control merchandising of their logos?
The answer begins with the fundamental justification of trademark law: improving the
functioning of the market by reducing consumer search costs. From a search costs
perspective, a general merchandising right unmoored from confusion conflicts with,
rather than promoting, trademark law’s pro-competitive goals. If consumers are not
duped into believing that a trademark-bearing product was either sponsored or made by
the trademark holder,80 then the quality of product-related information in the marketplace
has not suffered from the use.81 And the overarching goal of market competition will
only gain: the unlicensed product will presumably compete in the marketplace with any
licensed versions, bringing prices down, letting consumers choose higher-quality
products with identical logos, and generally benefiting the consumer. On balance, then,
non-confusing uses of marks on merchandise serve, rather than impede, competition in
the marketplace, thus promoting the overall goals of trademark and unfair competition
law.
Trademark law facilitates market competition by permitting consumers to find
80

Compare Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG v. Universal Brass, Inc., 1995 WL 420816, at *3
(W.D. Wash. 1995) (finding confusion based on use of registered Porsche trademark,
together with ® symbol, which suggested official sponsorship by Porsche); cf. Bi-Rite
Enters, Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1193-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (suggesting
that confusion as to sponsorship of band paraphernalia may exist when the merchandise
is sold at concerts and other contexts in which consumers may assume official
sponsorship).
81

See, e.g., Board of Governors of University of North Carolina v. Helpingstine, 714 F.
Supp. 167, 173 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (“In essence, the court is skeptical that those individuals
who purchase unlicensed tee-shirts bearing UNC-CH’s marks care one way or the other
whether the University sponsors or endorses such products or whether the products are
officially licensed.”).
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products cheaply and quickly by relating advertising and their own experiences to the
products they buy. An infringement of a trademark is one that increases consumer search
costs, normally by confusing consumers. Trademarks can extend not only to words and
logos, but to trade dress and even the color or shape of a product. But trademark law
does not give rights over an entire product class, because doing so would short-circuit the
very market competition trademark law is supposed to protect.82

Similarly, a

merchandising right would give rights over irreplaceable product features, which
inevitably increases the cost of those products. If only one company controls the sale of
Seattle Seahawks T-shirts, those shirts will cost more and be of worse quality than if the
market competes to provide those shirts.83 Consumers lose something tangible – they pay
more for the shirt, or they are unable to express their support for the Seahawks because
they can’t afford the shirt, or they get a lower quality shirt. There must be some reason
for the law to compel that loss.
The Boston Hockey approach has no logical stopping point. It conflicts with the
text of the Lanham Act, which makes infringement turn not on mental association, but on
confusion, deception, or mistake.84 More significantly, it leaves us without an effective
standard for determining when a use of a trademark is legal. The merchandising right

82

See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (refusing to
protect product configurations as trademarks unless consumers view them as such);
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (refusing to extend
trademark protection to aspects of products that improve their performance).

83

See Paul J. Heald, Filling Two Gaps in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition: Mixed-Use Trademarks and the Problem with Vanna, 47 S.C. L. Rev. 783,
788-89 (1996).
84

45 U.S.C. §§ 1114(a), 1125(a); see generally Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to
Evoke, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 291 (2003).
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cases seem to stem from the unjust enrichment instinct that “if value, then right.”85 But
as we have explained elsewhere, that instinct has no solid basis in public policy.86 It
would make each of the countless “nominative uses” trademark law permits into
infringements.87 And it would turn trademark law from a right designed to facilitate
commerce into a right to control language, something the courts have repeatedly warned
against given its troubling implications for both competition and free speech.88 College
students and football fans couldn’t support their team unless they paid the required fee.89
Newspapers might be at risk for using brand names or logos in connection with their
stories. Aqua couldn’t sing the song “Barbie Girl,”90 or Walking Mountain create art
using Barbie dolls,91 even though consumers weren’t confused. Individuals might even
85

Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the
Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397, 405 (1990).
86

See Dogan & Lemley, Keywords, supra note __; Lemley, Free Riding, supra note __.

87

See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.
1992) (permitting unlicensed use of a trademark to refer to its owner, even when used by
the defendant for commercial advantage).
88

See, e.g., CPC Int’l v. Skippy, Inc., 214 F.3d 456 (4th Cir. 2000); Nissan Motor Co. v.
Nissan Computer Corp., __ F.3d __, 2004 WL 1753289 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2004). For a
discussion of trademarks and the First Amendment, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J.
147, 216-24 (1998).
89

Cf. University Book Store et al. v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin, 1994
WL 747886, at *10 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (prior to applying to register its marks with the
Patent and Trademark Office, “Applicant, like numerous other colleges and universities,
permitted others to sell imprinted merchandise as expressions of community support and
goodwill.”); see generally Jeffrey Zaslow, Sports Fans Snap up Souvenirs of Winners
Beating Losers: Mascot Boiled or Grilled?, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 2003, at A1
(describing the increased demand for “rivalry merchandise” mocking competitors’
mascots, and the growth in licensed versions of such products in which universities
control the message).
90

Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (permitting this use).

91

Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003)
(permitting this use).
30

Merchandising Right Dogan & Lemley

DRAFT

be liable for wearing tattoos or jewelry containing trademarked logos, or tattoo parlors for
applying them.92
Further, accepting free riding as the basis for a merchandising right would
encourage courts more generally to focus on “free riding” and “trading on goodwill” as
inherent evils,93 and to move toward a presumption of illegality for any use of someone
else’s trademark. Limiting doctrines like “trademark use” and perhaps even “nominative
use” have already proven challenging for courts to apply because of the temptation to
assume that any use of a trademark must necessarily be a bad one. This doesn’t mean
trademark law will lose all its defenses. The First Amendment will continue to protect
certain uses of a trademark, particularly in parody and news reporting. But the structural
limits on the scope of trademark and dilution law are intellectually harder to maintain if
we simultaneously treat the same marks as pure property rights in the merchandising
context.
To be sure, we might try to cabin the merchandising right so that it doesn’t reach
desirable uses. But to do so we would need a theory of merchandising control that is
broader than consumer search costs and the avoidance of confusion, but not as broad as
92

For a discussion of this possibility, see Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole,
Written on the Body: Intellectual Property Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body
Art, 10 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 97, 123-31 (2003). Cotter and Mirabole conclude that the
individual would not be liable under current law, and that the tattoo parlor shouldn’t be
either, though the question is closer.
93

A merchandising right seems more like a physical property right than traditional
trademark law does. For criticism of treating trademarks as property, see Mark A.
Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1697
(1999). But the two are not coextensive. It is possible to treat trademarks as property in
certain respects – for example, permitting them to be sold or used as security interests,
see Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Bankrupting Trademarks, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1267
(2004) – without necessarily extending protection to any use of a logo.
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unjust enrichment or appropriation of goodwill. As we will find in the next sections,
such a justification for the merchandising right is hard to come by.

C.

Preserving Existing Expectations

Even absent a good theoretical justification for a broad merchandising right,
advocates might fall back on a practical concern. It seems clear that trademark owners
assume they have a right to control merchandising.

Wouldn’t it upset the settled

expectations of those trademark owners to suddenly nullify the right? Similarly, might
consumers be confused if they too believe that any T-shirt bearing a corporate logo is
licensed by the corporation?
The first concern need not detain us long. First, based on our review of the cases
in Part I, it is far from clear that trademark owners are reasonable in assuming the
existence of such a right.

The case law support for it has never been strong or

unequivocal. Second, there is no obvious investment that will be lost if the broad
merchandising theory is rejected. Trademark owners won’t lose their protection against
consumer confusion or dilution. Nor can the trademark owner make a plausible case that
a competing sale of, say, Dallas Cowboys hats will weaken the connection between the
mark and the team. True, the Cowboys might make less money than they would if
trademarks were absolute property rights, and they might argue that this “discourages
investment” in football. But so what? The point of trademark law has never been to
maximize profits for trademark owners at the expense of competitors and consumers.
And the investment at issue in these cases is not investment in the quality of the

32

Merchandising Right Dogan & Lemley

DRAFT

underlying product (the team), but investment in merchandising the brand itself. As
Ralph Brown quite sensibly suggested, this is not the goal of the law.94

The consumer concern is a more significant one. It is possible that consumers
have come to expect that San Francisco Giants jerseys are licensed by the Giants, not
because they serve a brand-identifying function, but simply because the law has
sometimes required such a relationship.95 Indeed, the NFL cases we discussed above
found evidence of this. If this expectation exists, consumers may be confused if the law
changes. If so, a law based on eliminating consumer confusion may be obliged to give
trademark owners the right to prevent such uses in order to avoid this confusion.
Or perhaps not.

Glynn Lunney derides this sort of confusion argument as

circular,96 and of course in some sense it is. The idea that once-legal conduct becomes
illegal simply because the public believes it is illegal seems like bootstrapping.97 But if
we are committed to basing trademark doctrine on consumer reactions, we might be stuck
94. See Ralph S. Brown Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of
Trade Symbols, 57 Yale L.J. 1165, 1177-80 (1948). Others have echoed this view. See
Felix Cohen, supra note __, at 815; Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New
Economic Orthodoxy of Rights Management, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 462, 506-14 (1998);
Heald, supra note __, at 791-92; Litman, supra note __, at __.
95
Rob Denicola cites consumer surveys presented in merchandising cases that support
this conclusion. See Denicola, Freedom to Copy, supra note __, at 1668 n. 37.
96

Lunney, supra note __, at __.

97

Some courts have taken the merchandising right so far as to conclude that “consumer
confusion” may occur where consumers are not in fact confused about the relationship
between the two products, but nonetheless believe that the defendant might have needed a
license to use the mark. See Anheuser-Busch v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 775
(8th Cir. 1994); accord Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 544-45 (5th
Cir. 1998). For criticism of this approach, see, for example, Lunney, supra note
(manuscript at 31, 43), who suggests that this approach is intellectually dishonest, and
Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, The Juice and Fair Use: How the Grinch Silenced a Parody,
45 J. Copyright Soc’y 546, 624 (1998).
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with those reactions even if bad legal decisions initially helped create them. The real
underlying issue is whether the trademark law should act here as a creator or as a
reflector of societal norms.98

In the context of likelihood of confusion analysis,

trademark law has traditionally adapted itself to reflect societal norms, rendering a use
illegal if but only if it confuses consumers. In other areas, however, trademark law acts
as a norms creator, establishing standards that shape rather than merely respond to
consumer beliefs. The law creates certain limiting doctrines – genericide, trademark use,
and fair use, for example – that constrain the scope of trademark rights and that exist
whether or not the public is aware of them.99

Trademark’s norm-creation role is

important because it prevents a downward spiral in which the court focuses on the most
gullible consumers, lowering the standards and expectations of others.100

Rigorous

application of these doctrines can affect consumer perceptions. In effect, the law is
leading rather than following consumer expectations.
The merchandising theory presents a difficult problem in choosing between these
functions. On the one hand, the merchandising theory is an effort to expand the basic
scope of trademark protection beyond its usual bounds. Thus, it seems analogous to other
limiting doctrines that are intrinsic to the law, not dependent on consumer expectations.

98

Graeme Dinwoodie, 43 Hous. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2004); Dogan & Lemley,
supra note __, at __.

99

See Dogan & Lemley, supra note __, at __ (discussing the role of trademark law as a
norms creator in creating limiting doctrines like trademark use). There is currently a split
in the circuits as to whether the fair use doctrine is independent of consumer confusion,
or requires proof of the absence of confusion. The Supreme Court will resolve that issue
– and have an opportunity to address the norm creator/norm follower distinction – this
year in the KP Holdings case.
100

See Litman, Breakfast With Batman, supra note __, at __.
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As Robert Denicola has pointed out, the role of trademark law as norms creator may be
especially important in merchandising cases. Unlike the ordinary trademark case, in
which an infringing defendant can simply choose another mark and compete fairly in the
relevant market, “a defendant enjoined from using a well-known insignia on T-shirts or
caps is effectively excluded from the market. It can sell to no one, including those who
care not the slightest whether their Boston Red Sox cap is licensed or approved.”101 On
the other hand, if it is correct that consumers now believe T-shirts are sponsored by the
owner of the logos emblazoned on them, that assumption seems to fit within the
likelihood of confusion analysis as to which trademark law has traditionally been a norms
reflector.
We are inclined to believe that this is a case in which the law should act as a
norms creator. In part this is because any consumer confusion is itself an artifact of legal
cases that seemed to create a new merchandising right; arguably it should be up to the
courts, not consumers, to undo the problems a few ill-considered decisions may have
created. This is particularly so when consumers’ belief that the law requires permission
to use a logo may not matter at all to their assessment of the quality of the merchandise at
issue, such as when the product prominently identifies its manufacturer.102 If individuals
don’t “care one way or the other whether [the trademark holder] sponsors or endorses
such products or whether the products are officially licensed,”103 then the competitive

101

Denicola, supra note __, at 613.

102

Cf. Greater Anchorage, Inc. v. Nowell, 974 F.2d 1342 (Table) (9th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting merchandising claim, when “customers actually believed the pins were
‘illegal.’ Thus, there is no evidence that people actually believe that [defendant’s] pins
are associated with” plaintiff).
103

Board of Gov. of Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 173 (M.D.N.C.
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process certainly does not suffer from their assumption that the use required a license.
A second reason for courts not to blindly defer to consumer norms in
merchandising cases is that the law can likely cure most confusion of this type without
eliminating competition, simply by requiring a conspicuous disclaimer. Some courts
have tried to steer a middle ground by permitting such uses but requiring that the user
take all reasonable steps to try to reduce confusion both at the point of purchase and postsale.104 Robert Bone suggests that the law should aggressively create norms here and rule
that a disclaimer is the sole remedy in all merchandising cases. We would not go that far.
As we note in the next section, there may be rare instances of post-sale confusion that
would not be cured by a disclaimer.
How would a disclaimer-based analysis proceed?

As an initial matter, the

plaintiffs would have to prove consumer confusion. We haven’t seen sufficient evidence
to persuade us that consumers do in fact think this way in a significant number of cases.
A merchandising right based on a likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship should
require proof of likely consumer confusion, just as any other trademark infringement
claim.105 If consumers don’t assume sponsorship from the use of a logo on a T-shirt, or if
a conspicuous disclaimer would be sufficient to cure any such confusion, there is no basis
for granting the trademark owner merchandising protection.

1989).
104

See, e.g., Plasticolor Molded Prods. v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329, 1338-39
(C.D. Cal. 1989) (Kozinski, J., sitting by designation). See also Note, Promotional
Goods and the Functionality Doctrine: An Economic Model of Trademarks, 63 Tex. L.
Rev. 639, 664-69 (1984).

105

See also Withers, supra note __, at 453 (arguing that merchandising should be illegal
only where consumers are likely to be confused).
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There are lots of famous marks and icons for which we have not granted
merchandising rights. No one controls the exclusive right to make “Statue of Liberty” tshirts or paperweights, for example. And while consumers might make this assumption in
the context of some famous marks, particularly in the field of professional sports,106 there
are many more marks for which there is no evidence that consumers expect the trademark
owner to be the only manufacturer.107 Even if we decide we cannot undo what some
cases have done in the sports context, there is no reason to extend the merchandising right
any further, since it is hard to find any theoretical or statutory basis for the property
approach to trademarks.108
One policy argument sometimes raised in favor of granting merchandising rights
is that it provides needed financial support for the trademark owner.109 This is a slightly
altered form of the argument that merchandise rights serve as incentives, an argument

106

The National Football League, in particular, has had considerable success in
establishing that consumers assume it has licensed uses of NFL team logos and other
trademarks. See, e.g., National Football League v. Governor of the State of Delaware,
435 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 (D. Del. 1977) (“Apparently, in this day and age when
professional sports teams franchise pennants, teeshirts, helmets, drinking glasses and a
wide range of other products, a substantial number of people believe, if not told
otherwise, that one cannot conduct an enterprise of this kind without NFL approval.”).
107

See Denicola, supra note __, at 612 (“If the NFL successfully establishes a reputation
for aggressively marketing its insignia, we may readily assume its sponsorship of book
bags marked with the logo of the Dallas Cowboys, yet refrain from an analogous
attribution of sponsorship for bags displaying the mascot of the local high school.”); see
also id. (discussing other contexts in which assumption of sponsorship may be more
likely, such as musician-related sales occurring at concert sites rather than at other
locations).
108

Judge Kozinski suggests that a case-by-case balancing approach is appropriate in these
circumstances. See Kozinski, supra note __, at 971.

109

See, e.g., Withers, supra note __, at __ (noting this argument).
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that has been soundly refuted elsewhere.110 Merchandise may be an indirect way of
subsidizing colleges and other trademark owners, though we are skeptical that the
argument has much persuasive force when applied to corporations such as Nike or CocaCola rather than to universities. But if the goal of consumers is to contribute to the
school, there are other, more direct ways of doing so. Indeed, if consumers do in fact
value obtaining goods from the trademark owner itself – perhaps because it supports the
school or team – then we would expect the market to reflect that by developing a
distinction between ordinary merchandise and officially licensed merchandise. This may
reflect the best of all worlds, because consumers will learn whether merchandise is
sponsored by the trademark owner or not, and can choose their goods accordingly.111 A
requirement of a conspicuous disclaimer would help such a market develop.

The

emphasis in merchandising inquiries would appropriately shift, then, to whether the
defendant had deceptively suggested that its goods were officially licensed by the
trademark holder.112 That is something within the traditional competence of trademark
110

See, e.g., Veronica J. Cherniak, Ornamental Use of Trademarks: The Judicial
Development and Economic Implications of an Exclusive Merchandising Right, 69 Tul.
L. Rev. 1311, 1349-52 (1995). Among other problems, Cherniak notes that unlike
copyrighted works, there is no particular reason to encourage the creation of new
trademarks; that trademark owners already have substantial incentive to invest in their
brands because of the association between those brands and their products; and that there
are other ways for companies to capitalize on the positive value of their goodwill.
111

Scott Kieff even goes so far as to suggest that this distinction can replace copyright,
because even without copyright customers will voluntarily choose to support favored
artists. F. Scott Kieff, The Case Against Copyright: A Comparative Institutional Analysis
of Intellectual Property Regimes (working paper 2004). One does not have to go this far
to believe that consumers may choose to support affinity groups by opting to purchase
licensed products.

112

See Denicola, supra note __, at 613; see, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v.
Diversified Packing Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 383 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding trademark violation
when defendant’s advertisements contained cartoons similar to plaintiff’s cartoons and
called for customers to “Buy Direct and Save”); Wyatt Earp Enters. v. Sackman, Inc.,
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law, and a task courts are well-equipped to perform.
We conclude, therefore, that the fact that consumers may believe trademark
owners have a right to control merchandise bearing their brands doesn’t itself justify a
merchandising right. The issue is certainly not free from doubt, and we can readily
imagine a court concluding that even if the merchandising theory is unpersuasive, we
have gone too far down that road to turn back now. But even if a court were to take that
position, a limited, likelihood-of-confusion rationale for keeping a bad law intact is quite
different from a theoretical justification for cementing and extending the merchandising
right.

D.

The Scope of Counterfeiting Law

A third concern with eliminating the merchandising right is that it might interfere
with efforts to prevent certain types of counterfeiting. Counterfeiting is the canonical
case of trademark infringement. A defendant copies the trademark owner’s brand or
mark and affixes it to goods identical in appearance to the trademarked goods, passing its
own goods off as the trademark owner’s. There is no question that counterfeiting violates
the trademark laws because it confuses consumers; indeed, it is also a crime.113 This

157 F. Supp. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (enjoining sale of unlicensed costumes whose
boxes were stamped “official outfit”).
113

18 U.S.C. § 2320. It is worth noting, however, that that statute does not expand
trademark liability, but rather provides that all the limitations on and defenses to the
Lanham Act apply to it as well. Id. § 2320(c). At least one court has held that the statute
does not apply to the sale of trademarks as products, rather than as labels for goods that
imitate the trademark holder’s. United States v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2000).
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form of passing off has little to do with a merchandising right, since ordinary trademark
law seems perfectly well suited to deal with it.
Suppose, however, that the circumstances of the counterfeit sale are sufficient to
dispel any buyer confusion. The example often cited is a fake Rolex watch bought on the
street corner for $20.114 The buyer of the fake Rolex presumably doesn’t believe he is
getting the real thing.

Nonetheless, there seems something intuitively wrong with

permitting the copying of the Rolex trademark, even in circumstances where the buyer
knows what they are getting. Similarly, one might think that sellers of “knock-off” Prada
handbags, Chanel perfumes, or Nike T-shirts are causing harm of some sort to the
trademark owner, even if it is not the classic harm of displaced sales. One benefit of a
merchandising right would be to create a cause of action against those who copy
trademarked goods even in the absence of consumer confusion.
It’s worth exploring further the intuition that the copier’s conduct is wrongful.
There seem four possible bases for such an intuition. First, there may be concerns about
actual confusion. Take Nike. Because Nike is an apparel manufacturer, consumers who
see a T-shirt with the familiar “swoosh” on it may well assume that Nike is selling the Tshirt, even if they really want the shirt because they think the swoosh looks cool, not
because they think Nike makes high-quality clothing. If consumers do in fact think Nike
is selling the T-shirt, the likely legal effect will be that Nike gets control over the swoosh,
at least on clothing.115 This control seems similar to what a merchandising right would

114

See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note __, at __.

115

The issue here is a bit different from the norm creator-norm enforcer distinction we
discussed above. There, the question was whether consumers believed the mark must be
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give. But that is an accident of the fact that Nike is an apparel manufacturer, and it is
reasonable to assume that they will make and sell T-shirts as well as shoes. A right based
on such actual confusion would not protect Nike against the use of swooshes on
kitchenware; nor would it protect Coca-Cola against the use of its logo on T-shirts. It is
not a merchandising right, but simply an application of traditional principles of consumer
confusion.

Further, this sort of traditional confusion may well be dispelled by an

appropriately conspicuous disclaimer.
A second concern that might justify a prohibition against copying of logos is the
fear that even though the buyer isn’t confused, others might be. Assuming that the $20
fake Rolex looks like the real one, even if I know that I bought the fake one, others may
not be able to tell the difference. This in turn can cause harm; if people see Rolexes that
don’t tell time well, or break, they may mistakenly attribute the shoddy quality of the
counterfeit goods to the trademark owner. Traditional trademark law deals with this
problem under the rubric of “post-sale confusion.”

This was the situation in Lois

Sportswear v. Levi Strauss & Co.116 There, Levi Strauss had registered not only its trade
name and its jean labels, but also the pattern of stitching on the back pockets of its jeans.
Lois Sportswear sold jeans with clearly different labels, but with an identical stitching
pattern.

The trial court found that there was no evidence of actual confusion by

purchasers, but that non-purchasers seeing the jeans "worn by a passer-by" would likely
be confused. The Second Circuit held that this post-sale confusion constituted trademark

licensed; here it is whether they believe Nike is actually selling the T-shirts. The latter is
closer to the core of consumer confusion, and the law presumably should respond to such
a consumer belief.
116

799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986).
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infringement: "The confusion the Act seeks to prevent in this context is that a consumer
seeing the familiar stitching pattern will associate the jeans with [Levis] and that
association will influence his buying decisions."117 The doctrine of post-sale confusion
can take care of a significant number of counterfeiting cases without the need for a
merchandising right. It is important not to assume that any use of a logo will inevitably
confuse viewers after the sale, however. Courts sometimes reject logo counterfeiting
claims where it does not appear likely that consumers will be confused.118
A third concern might exist even in the absence of post-sale confusion. For
certain types of goods – called Veblen goods – the value of the good to a consumers is a
function of scarcity and corresponding exclusivity or “snob appeal.” Veblen goods
therefore exhibit a sort of anti-network effect; acquisition of the good by new consumers
actually reduces the value of the good to existing owners.119 Judge Kozinski suggests
that for Veblen goods, exclusive control over merchandising may help preserve the image
consumers want to associate with the goods. Even if neither the buyer nor anyone else
who sees them believes that counterfeit Rolex watches are real, if they proliferate it may
destroy consumer expectations about what it means to wear a Rolex.120 There may
therefore be a loss of social surplus resulting from competition, because counterfeiting a
117

Id. at __. See also Car-Freshner Corp. v. Big Lots Stores Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 145
(N.D.N.Y. 2004).
118

See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1507
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting claim of counterfeiting of knock-off handbags where
differences made consumers unlikely to be confused).
119

See Stan Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on
Copyright: The Roles of Theory, Empirics, and Network Effects [draft at 6] (working
paper December 2003) (modeling Veblen goods as a form of negative network effect).
120

See Kozinski, supra note __, at 969-70; accord Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin,
Counterfeit Goods, 29 J.L. & ECON. 211, 214 (1986).
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Veblen good harms consumers of the true Veblen good in a way that counterfeiting a
non-Veblen good does not.
We are not fully persuaded that this economic concern justifies the creation of a
merchandising right for Veblen goods.

By definition, the counterfeit goods in this

category are ones that people don’t associate with Rolex; otherwise, they will be covered
under the regular or post-sale confusion rationales discussed above.

If they don’t

associate the counterfeit goods with Rolex, it is not clear that existing owners of Veblen
goods will be harmed. And consumers of the distinguishable knockoff will clearly
benefit.121 Alternatively, even if this is a valid utilitarian rationale for a merchandising
right, it does not extend beyond Veblen goods to normal goods.
A final concern, and what may really be animating much of the push for
merchandising protection, is an interest in protecting the product itself. It is no accident
that Rolex is the most often used example of counterfeiting, and that many of the other
examples involve the exact duplication of products and not just brand names. People’s
sympathies are naturally aroused by the fact that the defendant is copying the plaintiff’s
product almost exactly. There seems something wrong with the defendant copying the
plaintiff’s design, particularly if the economic effect may be for consumers to substitute
the cheap knock-off for the more expensive genuine product.
We think this final instinct, while understandable, is misplaced. The Lanham Act

121

Cf. Shelly Branch, Style & Substance: Hermes’s Jelly Ache, Wall St. J., Apr. 9,
2004, at B1 (describing demand for knockoffs of Hermes “jelly bags,” and suggesting
that Hermes may have squeezed up prices of the knockoffs by aggressively pursuing
sellers).
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is not a design protection statute. U.S. law gives limited protection for the actual design
of a product through design patent law, copyright law, and sui generis protection for
vessel hull designs.122 European law gives somewhat more protection.123 Each of those
laws is animated by a desire to encourage the creation of new designs. Further, each law
is limited in duration, and the designs so protected eventually enter the public domain.
Trademark law, by contrast, is ill-suited to serve as a design protection statute. Its
purposes are consumer protection and information disclosure, not encouraging creativity.
Its protection lasts forever, and does not initially vest with the first creator, but rather the
first to use the design to brand its goods. One of the real risks of the merchandising
theory is precisely that it will subvert the proper goals of trademark law and leave in its
place an ill-tailored, overreaching form of judicial design legislation.

E.

Can Dilution Save the Merchandising Right?

Trademark law has recently expanded beyond its traditional scope of likelihood of
confusion to protect the owners of certain famous marks against “dilution.”124 Could
dilution provide a back-door way of obtaining merchandising rights for famous
trademarks? We think it is unlikely, for two reasons.
First, the theoretical basis for a dilution claim does not cover merchandising.

122

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (design patent law); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining
“useful articles” subject to copyright protection); id. §§1301-1332 (Vessel Hull
Protection Act).
123

European Design Protection Directive, 98/71/EC (October 1998).

124

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
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Some have criticized dilution law for treating trademarks as property.125 But, properly
understood, dilution is targeted at reducing consumer search costs just as traditional
trademark law is. Dilution takes two forms: blurring the distinctive significance of a
mark by associating it with lots of different products, and tarnishing the image of the
mark by associating it with unwholesome products. Both blurring and tarnishment can
make it somewhat more difficult for consumers to associate a famous mark with its
owner.
Merchandising uses do not blur the distinctive significance of a mark in the mind
of consumers. Rather, they reinforce it. The University of Texas might suffer blurring of
its brand if the color orange and the image of a longhorn with the intertwined letters
“UT” were used as a trademark to sell unrelated goods. But if the logo appears on Tshirts worn by UT fans, that use strengthens the connection in the minds of the public
between the logo and the University. Merchandising uses are unlikely to create blurring
problems.
In certain cases trademark dilution law will protect the owners of famous marks
against the use of their mark in a way that will tarnish the trademark.126 But tarnishment
requires proof that the defendant used the mark to brand goods, not just that they used the

125

See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Monopolies in the Blue Nowhere, 28 Wm.
Mitchell L. Rev. 1091 (2002); Kenneth L. Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion of
Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 85 Trademark Rptr. 525
(1995).
126

See, e.g., Coca-Cola v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F.Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(enjoining use of a poster using the Coca-Cola colors and font that read “Enjoy
Cocaine”).
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mark as the subject of a T-shirt.127 For example, if a defendant sells Toyota brand
pornography, those who encounter the use may think less highly of the Toyota brand
name because they subconsciously associate it with pornography, even if they understand
that the car company did not itself sponsor the materials. By contrast, an irate consumer
wearing a T-shirt that says “Toyota sucks” or shows a cartoon character urinating on the
Ford logo isn’t tarnishing the brand in the sense the law cares about. These protest uses
don’t interfere with consumers’ association between the logo and the company through
some subconscious pollution.

If anything, they strengthen the mental connection

between trademark holder and mark, albeit in a way the company might not like. The use
of logos on merchandise isn’t actionable as tarnishment, therefore, as long as the point of
the logo is to refer to the trademark owner and not to brand an unrelated product. To be
sure, courts applying the tarnishment doctrine have sometimes used it to target criticism
or derogatory speech about the trademark owner, a result that finds little justification in
the search cost rationale.128 Those courts are clearly mistaken in their understanding of
the doctrine, however, and most courts properly distinguish the two.129
Second, even if dilution theory were somehow stretched to cover merchandising,
as a practical matter the federal dilution statute seems unlikely to provide the kind of
protection against the use of logos that trademark owners desire. First, the Supreme

127

See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (defining
tarnishment); 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § __.
128

See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).

129

See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir.
2003); Mastercard Int’l v. Nader 2000 Primary Committee, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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Court in 2003 construed the statute as requiring trademark owners to prove actual
dilution of the significance of their mark, rather than merely a likelihood of dilution, at
least where the marks were not identical.130 As a practical matter demonstrating actual
dilution has proven extremely difficult,131 rendering the federal dilution statute of little
practical value to trademark owners. Further, even if the likelihood of dilution standard
were reinstated,132 the dilution law applies only to “commercial use in commerce” of the
mark.133 This test requires use of the mark as a brand in proposing a commercial
transaction,134 something that printing a logo on a T-shirt simply doesn’t do. For all of
these reasons, it seems unlikely that trademark owners will be able to use federal dilution
law to justify a merchandising right.135

130

Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003). The Court twice distinguished
the case of identical marks, but never held that they were subject to the likelihood of
dilution standard.

131

For examples of cases rejecting dilution claims after Moseley, see, e.g., Nitro Leisure
Prods. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf,
Inc., 337 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2003); Starbucks Corp. v. Lundburg, 2004 WL 1784753 (D.
Or. Aug. 10, 2004); Mastercard Int’l v. Nader 2000 Primary Committee, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d
1046 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); HBP, Inc. v. American Marine Holdings, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1320
(M.D. Fla. 2003). The courts in General Motors Corp. v. Autovation Technologies, Inc.,
317 F. Supp. 2d 756, 764 (E.D. Mich. 2004) and 7-Eleven Co. v. McEvoy, 300 F. Supp.
2d 352 (D. Md. 2004) did find actual dilution under the Moseley standard in cases where
the trademarks were identical.

132

The International Trademark Association has proposed legislation to do just that.

133

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).

134

See H.R. Rep. 104-374, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (adopting existing constitutional
standards of “commercial speech”).

135

Moseley does not apply to state dilution statutes, and some of them might be
interpreted more broadly than the federal act. However, these statutes are still targeted at
blurring and tarnishment, neither of which are properly at issue in the merchandising
cases.
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Merchandising Rights and the Supreme Court

While the merchandising right might seem to be a fait accompli despite its
dubious legal basis, recent developments suggest that the time may be right to reopen the
debate.136 In particular, the Supreme Court’s trademark jurisprudence over the past
decade has shown a return to core trademark values, with consumer expectations a central
focus and the value of competition paramount. At the very least, these cases validate the
trend toward requiring confusion in merchandising cases, and away from the more
generalized right enunciated in Boston Hockey and its progeny. But they may go much
further.

Beyond reaffirming an approach to trademark law heavily rooted in

informational harm and consumer expectations, these opinions manifest a deep-rooted
concern for the inherent value of competition in product markets. If competitive markets
are the ultimate goal, the solution, even in merchandising cases raising risks of
sponsorship-based confusion, may lie in something short of an absolute injunction against
use of the mark.137
A.

Consumer Perceptions and Confusion as to Source

Beginning with our more modest contention, it seems clear that the current
Supreme Court would reject a merchandising claim that did not turn on confusion as to
source or sponsorship. Over the past decade, the Court has insisted with increasing vigor
136

See Withers, supra note __, at 455-56.

The debate over the merchandising right has raged since the mid-1970s, and many
courts and commentators have contended that the right ignores both the confusion
requirement and the need for competitors to have access to features that consumers find
important to the appeal of a product. See, e.g., [string cites].
137

See generally Bone, supra note __ (advocating disclaimer as the exclusive remedy in
merchandising cases generally).
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that trademark rights and trademark infringement both depend upon consumer
expectations and perceptions, rather than some abstract equitable code of conduct.
Unless consumers perceive a mark as a brand, it does not merit protection; and unless
consumers perceive a defendant’s use of the mark as an indication of product source or
sponsorship, the use does not infringe. These principles flow inevitably from trademark
law’s emphasis on informational clarity and competition, and argue against a broad
merchandising right for trademark holders.
As to the first point, the Supreme Court has consistently held (and the Lanham
Act requires)138 that trademark status depends on proof that consumers are likely to
perceive the mark as a brand. Absent a “consumer predisposition to equate the feature
with the source,”139 the mark is not serving as a trademark, and its use by others cannot
infringe. From a search costs perspective, this makes perfect sense: unless a feature
serves as a brand, its use by competitors will not confuse consumers as to the source or
sponsorship of the competitors’ products, and the clarity of marketplace information will
be unaffected. Consumers, meanwhile, will benefit from competition among sellers of
the feature. And while the Court has held that some word marks and trade dress by their
nature serve to indicate source,140 others – such as product configuration141 and color142 –

138

See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining trademark as a symbol that “indicates the source” of a
product, even if the source is unknown).

139

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000); see also id.
(“Consumers are aware of the reality that, almost invariably, even the most unusual of
product designs – such as a cocktail shaker shaped like a penguin – is intended not to
identify the source, but to render the product itself more useful or appealing.”).
140

In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), the Court held that
inherently distinctive trade dress could qualify for protection without a showing of
secondary meaning. To be “inherently distinctive,” however, the mark’s “intrinsic
nature” must “serv[e] to identify a particular source of a product” – i.e., consumers must
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are presumed to serve an aesthetic rather than source-identifying function until secondary
meaning is established.143 The Court’s focus on consumer perceptions follows from
trademark law’s competition-based rationale: absent some indication that a competitor’s
use of a product feature will confuse consumers and therefore increase their search costs,
competition in that feature will best serve the interests of the public.144
This consumer-perceptions-based eligibility standard has both direct and indirect
implications for merchandising claims. Doctrinally, it suggests that a trademark holder
cannot establish distinct rights in the mark as a trademark for merchandise145 without

perceive it as a brand, albeit one with which they may not yet be familiar. 505 U.S. at
768; see also id. at 769 (citing Restatement, Third, of Unfair Competition § 13 &
comment (a)); Restatement, Third, of Unfair Competition § 13(a) (a mark is “inherently
distinctive” if, “because of the nature of the designation and the context in which it is
used, prospective purchasers are likely to perceive it as a designation that … identifies
goods or services produced or sponsored by a particular person, whether known or
anonymous”) (emphasis added); id. comment (b) (defining inherently distinctive marks
as designations that “by their nature are likely to be perceived by prospective purchasers
as symbols of identification that indicate an association with a particular source”).
141

See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).

142

Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, Inc., 514 U.S. 159 (1995). In Qualitex, the Court
held that a product’s color could serve as a trademark, but only “where that color has
attained ‘secondary meaning’ and therefore identifies and distinguishes a particular brand
(and thus indicates its ‘source’)”. 514 U.S. at 163. Because color “does not immediately
… signal a brand or a product ‘source,’” id. at 162-63, its protection depends upon
evidence of actual consumer perceptions.

143

A mark has acquired secondary meaning when, “as a result of its use, prospective
purchasers have come to perceive it as a designation” of source or sponsorship of the
goods on which it appears. Rest. (Third) of Unfair Comp. § 13(b).
144

See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000)
(“Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard to the
utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that
facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon alleged inherent
distinctiveness.”).
145

Trademark holders have asserted two distinct types of merchandising claims. First,
some have claimed that they have established rights over a mark as used on merchandise,
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proving that consumers are likely to view it as a source indicator,146 rather than as an
inherently pleasing feature, when they see it incorporated into licensed products.147 If
this standard turns – as it should – on evidence rather than supposition, it will rarely be
met in a trademark merchandising case.148

More generally, the Supreme Court’s

either through common law usage (or licensing) or through registration, and that the
defendant’s use confuses consumers based on that merchandise-based brand. E.g.,
National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp.
651, 659 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (imposing requirement of secondary meaning as to
sponsorship, which “requires a showing that the public believes that the product bearing
the mark is sponsored or endorsed by plaintiff,” and finding requirement satisfied based
on survey evidence). This approach gives trademark holders a considerable advantage in
establishing likelihood of confusion, which weighs heavily the relatedness of goods
offered by the two parties. See, e.g., Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 30
(1st Cir. 1989) (finding confusion likely based partly on the fact that the BAA and
defendant “offer virtually the same goods: shirts and other wearing apparel”).
Alternatively – and more commonly – merchandising claims are based on the
trademark holder’s rights in its primary market for sports, education, entertainment, and
the like. The trademark holder in such a case must establish that the defendant’s use
confuses consumers despite the differences in products offered under the mark. See, e.g.,
Board of Gov. of Univ. of N. Carol. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 172-73 (M.D.
N.C. 1989) (agreeing “with Professor McCarthy that similarity or even identity of marks
is not sufficient to establish confusion where non-competitive goods are involved”);
University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 719-20 (W.D. Pa.
1983).
146

By “source indicator,” we mean an indication of source or sponsorship.

147

See University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 717 (W.D.
Pa. 1983) (“Although there may be some evidence in the record which would tend to
suggest that the Pitt insignia have taken on a secondary meaning for the provision of
educational and athletic services, there is simply no evidence that the Pitt insignia ever
have had any secondary meaning for soft goods.”); compare National Football League
Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 659 (W.D. Wash.
1982) (imposing requirement of secondary meaning as to sponsorship, which “requires a
showing that the public believes that the product bearing the mark is sponsored or
endorsed by plaintiff,” and finding requirement satisfied based on survey evidence).
148

Indeed, it is rarely even asserted. See Board of Gov. of Univ. of N. Carol. v.
Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 172 & n.2 (M.D. N.C. 1989) (treating merchandising
case as one involving unrelated goods, despite University’s sale of merchandise in its
bookstore, because sale of such merchandise “is not the primary business of the
University”); University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 717
(W.D. Pa. 1983); cf. University of Georgia Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1547
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faithfulness to a consumer-based approach to trademark law reaffirms the traditional
notion of trademark law as a facilitator of fair competition, rather than a property-based
regime, and implicitly rejects the unjust enrichment impulse reflected in Boston Hockey
and its progeny.149
Admittedly, the eligibility cases do not directly address the core question in many
merchandising cases: whether infringement requires real likelihood of confusion as to
product source, or whether it’s enough to show that the public recognizes the trademark
as emanating from the complaining party.

But the Court has recently given clear

guidance on this question in two other cases. First, in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, the
Court rejected the idea that mere mental association between the plaintiff’s trademark and
the defendant’s product could suffice to prove dilution of that trademark.150 And if
mental association is not enough to satisfy the dilution standard, it certainly won’t be
enough to show likelihood of confusion.

(11th Cir. 1985) (adopting Boston Hockey approach, and finding lack of product
proximity “less significant in the instant case,” where “the confusion stems not from the
defendant’s unfair competition with the plaintiff’s products, but from the defendant’s
misuse of the plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill as embodied in the plaintiff’s mark”).
But see Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 28-30 (1st Cir. 1989) (asserting
without further discussion that “apparel is related to the service provided by the BAA, the
race, and BAA is entitled to enjoin use of its mark on such items,” and going on to
analyze likelihood of confusion under a related-goods approach).
149

See generally Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28
(2001) (“protection for trade dress exists to promote competition”) (emphasis added);
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (trademark law “seeks
to promote competition by protecting a firm’s reputation”). Compare University Book
Store v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin, 1994 WL 747886, at *8 (TTAB
1984) (describing as “antiquated” the “view of trademarks as harmful monopolies which
must be rigorously confined within traditional bounds”).
150

Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003).

52

Merchandising Right Dogan & Lemley

DRAFT

Second, the Court’s decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp.,151 directly refutes the idea that infringement can occur without confusion as to the
source or sponsorship of the goods, and discredits the notion that any other form of
mental association counts in evaluating infringement.

Dastar involved a “reverse

passing-off” claim based on the sale of videotapes containing a movie created by the
plaintiff, but sold under the defendant’s name. The plaintiff contended that defendant
deceived the public into thinking that it, rather than plaintiff, had made the movie, and
that the sale of the movie under defendant’s name constituted a false designation of origin
under the Lanham Act.152 The Court rejected this theory, reasoning that “origin … of
goods” under the Lanham Act refers to the origin of the physical product sold in the
marketplace, rather than any ideas or communications included inside:
We think the most natural understanding of the ‘origin’ of ‘goods’ – the source of
wares – is the producer of the tangible product sold in the marketplace, in this
case the physical … video sold by Dastar. The concept might be stretched … to
include not only the actual producer, but also the trademark owner who
commissioned or assumed responsibility for (‘stood behind’) production of the
physical product. But as used in the Lanham Act, the phrase ‘origin of goods’ is
in our view incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated the ideas or
communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain.153
While most merchandising claims involve allegations of confusion as to product

151

539 U.S. 23.

152

Id. at 27; see 17 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (providing a cause of action against a “false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which … is likely to cause confusion … as to the origin … of his
or her goods”). The Dastar case was complicated by the fact that copyright in the movie
had expired, leaving the movie in the public domain. Id. at 26. The Court did not limit
its analysis to cases involving expired copyrights, however, and subsequent decisions
have not read it that narrowly. See, e.g., Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F.
Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2003).

153

Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-32.
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sponsorship, rather than origin, the Dastar reasoning has no less force in the sponsorship
context. To succeed in a sponsorship claim after Dastar, a trademark holder must
establish that defendant’s use of its mark will confuse consumers into believing it
sponsored the good sold by defendant. In merchandising cases, this means that the
trademark holder must establish that consumers are likely to believe that it makes or
stands behind the t-shirt, cap, or other merchandise at issue in the case. Boston Hockey’s
notion that infringement can turn on confusion as to source of the mark – i.e., of “the
ideas or communications” embodied in the product154 – runs directly counter to this
ruling.155
Indeed, Dastar seems particularly applicable in the merchandising context. When
fans buy Harvard shirts, or Chicago Cubs hats, or Rolling Stones tattoos, or Winnie-thePooh cakes from the local bakery, they are doing so not because they believe that
Harvard or the other trademark holders made or sponsored the good, but because the
trademark in this context serves an important communicative function for them.156 Just

154

Id.

155

See Boston Hockey, 510 F.2d 1004, 1011 (“The certain knowledge of the buyer that
the source and origin of the trademark symbols were in plaintiffs satisfies the requirement
of the act.”).
156

This is arguably truer in merchandising cases than in cases involving books, movies,
and other creative works like the film in Dastar itself, in which consumers are arguably
interested “not merely, if at all, in the identity of the producer of the physical tome (the
publisher), but also, and indeed primarily, in the identity of the creator of the story it
conveys.” 539 U.S. at 32. While acknowledging this tension, the Supreme Court in
Dastar found its approach critical to preserving the balance between trademark and
copyright law. See id. at 33. In any event, its reasoning clearly applies to products
valued for something other than their intellectual content. See id. The basic premise –
that consumer expectations need to be taken into account before deciding that the use of
the mark misleads the public as to source or sponsorship – translates readily into the
merchandising context.
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as in Dastar, the communication may come in the form of material protected by
copyright,157 or it may not; but the use of the trademark is unlikely to tell consumers
anything about the source of the goods bearing the mark, as opposed to the source of the
trademark or logo itself. And absent such an association, trademark law should have
nothing to say about the use of the mark. Lower courts interpreting Dastar have applied
it rigorously in such contexts, rejecting claims for passing off where the origin of the
goods is not in question, even if the plaintiff claims the underlying work originated with
him.158
Dastar reiterates the principle that has driven Supreme Court trademark
jurisprudence in recent years:

trademark law aims primarily to reflect consumer

perceptions about brands and to validate their expectations as to the source of goods in
the marketplace. Together with Moseley, it makes it clear that the Court would, at the
very least, make a showing of confusion a necessary condition to any merchandising
claim.159 Read most broadly, they could require proof that it matters to consumers

157

Winnie the Pooh, for example, still enjoys copyright protection, and the use of its
image may raise copyright concerns.

158

See, e.g., Zyla v. Wadsworth, 360 F.3d 243, 251-52 (1st Cir. 2004); Bob Creeden &
Assoc. v. Infosoft Inc., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2004 WL 830456 (N.D. Ill. April 14, 2004);
Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith System Mfg Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 969, 971-72 (N.D. Ill.
2003) (“There was no misrepresentation as to the ‘origin’ of the tables, … because there
was no misrepresentation, express or implied, as to the source of the components of the
tables.”).
159

See Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
(finding no infringement when defendants rightly identified themselves as “the ‘origin’”
of film “insofar as that term is used to define the manufacturer or producer of the physical
goods that were made available to the public,” even though the film contained plaintiffs’
copyrighted material).
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whether the trademark holder has officially sponsored merchandise bearing its mark.160
As the Supreme Court stated in Dastar, “The words of the Lanham Act should not be
stretched to cover matters that are typically of no consequence to purchasers.”161

B.

Functionality and the Costs of Trademark Rights

In addition to firming up the connection between trademark infringement and
marketplace clarity, the Court’s recent jurisprudence has shown a renewed emphasis on
the costs of trademark protection, and has suggested that these costs may sometimes
justify a refusal to grant relief even when the plaintiff has produced a risk of confusion.
In particular, the Court has underscored the importance of trademark’s functionality
doctrine in maintaining competitive markets.

As discussed above, the functionality

doctrine prevents a trademark holder from claiming rights to a feature if it is “‘essential
to the use or purpose of the article or affects the cost or quality of the article,’ that is, if
exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage.”162 And while the contours of the functionality doctrine have proven
challenging to fix, its basic rationale is simple: for a competitive marketplace to function,
competitors must have access to product features that consumers want for their inherent
160

See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text (discussing trademark law as norms
reflector or creator); see also University of North Carolina v. Halpingstine, 714 F. Supp.
167, 173 (“In essence, the court is skeptical that those individuals who purchase
unlicensed tee-shirts bearing UNC-CH’s marks care one way or the other whether the
University sponsors or endorses such products or whether the products are officially
licensed.”).
161

Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33.

162

Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (quoting Inwood
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 & n.10 (1982)).
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value, not because they indicate source.163
The functionality doctrine appears perfectly suited for the merchandising context.
In many – perhaps most – merchandising sales, competitors cannot satisfy consumers’
demand by substituting an alternative product feature for the trademark; because the
trademark effectively is the product, consumers will settle for nothing less than it.164 The
trademark therefore undeniably “affects the cost or quality of the article” and gives an
insurmountable competitive advantage to the trademark holder. Applying this reasoning,
a number of merchandising cases have used functionality as one basis for denying the
trademark holder’s claim.165
The standard for functionality has long been a matter of dispute, however,
particularly as applied to ornamentation rather than actual performance characteristics –
so-called “aesthetic functionality.”

Under some articulations, the standard gives

trademark holders some traction in arguing against its application. The Supreme Court
163

See id. at 170.

164

A Chicago Cubs fan seeking a baseball cap will not be satisfied with a hat with any
other feature, regardless of competitors’ efforts to devise aesthetically attractive designs.
Compare W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 340 (7th Cir. 1985) (asserting
that “it would be unreasonable to deny trademark protection to a manufacturer who had
the good fortune to have created a trade name, symbol, or design that became valued by
the consuming public for its intrinsic pleasingness as well as for the information it
conveyed about who had made the product,” and charging competitors with responsibility
to create alternative attractive products).

165

E.g., International Order of Job’s Daughers v. Lindenburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th
Cir. 1980) (“[I]n the context of this case, the name and emblem are functional aesthetic
components of the jewelry, in that they are being merchandised on the basis of their
intrinsic value, not as a designation of origin or sponsorship.”); University of Pittsburgh
v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 720-21 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (“Because the Pitt
insignia on soft goods serve a functional purpose and largely define a sub market of some
size, granting Pitt the relief it seeks would give Pitt a perpetual monopoly over that sub
market, precluding any competition in the Pitt insignia soft goods market.”).
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has sometimes described functional features as those whose competitive advantage
derives from their inherent qualities and not because of the reputation of the trademark
holder.166

Seizing on this language, some courts have rejected the functionality

doctrine167 in merchandising cases, reasoning that because the very appeal of trademark
merchandise lies in the reputation reflected in the trademark, the marks by definition
cannot be declared functional.168
The problem with this rationale lies in its overly broad understanding of the type
of “reputation-related advantage” that can make a feature non-functional. It seems clear
that the Court’s distinction between functional and non-functional features aims to
differentiate between features that confer a competitive advantage because of their
inherent nature, on the one hand, and those that do so because they indicate something
about the source of the product, on the other.169 The type of “reputational advantage”
that a non-functional mark confers, in other words, is in conveying valuable information

166

See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (referring to “non-reputation-related advantage”
conferred by functional features); id. at 169 (“The functionality doctrine thus protects
competitors against a disadvantage (unrelated to recognition or reputation) that
trademark protection might otherwise impose, namely, their inability reasonably to
replicate non-reputation-related product features.”) (emphasis added).

167

Technically, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the non-functionality of its
trademark, but given the unusual nature of the functionality issue in merchandising cases
– the mark claimed to be functional is admittedly a protected trademark – defendant
typically raise the issue in these cases. After it does so, however, plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing non-functionality.

168

See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 330 (2d Cir. 1983)
(describing functionality argument as “paradoxical …, since it is precisely the fact that
the symbols provide identification that make them ‘functional’ in the sense urged by Gay
Toys, while Warner’s exclusive right to use its own identifying symbols is exactly what it
seeks to protect.”).

169

See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (suggesting a feature is functional if it “plays an
important role in making a product more desirable”).
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to consumers about the reputation or qualities of the trademark holder as source or
sponsor of the product. The Restatement of Unfair Competition establishes this quite
clearly.170 An alternative reading would conflict with the lesson in Dastar that, when
trademark law talks about source or origin, it refers to the source or origin of the goods at
issue in a case, and not of their ingredients or other attributes. It would also conflict with
the Supreme Court’s most recent formulation of the functionality doctrine in TrafFix,
where the Court clearly contemplated a co-equal role for traditional and aesthetic
functionality.171
Nonetheless, there may be merchandising cases in which the trademark serves as
both source-identifier and as a critical feature of the product, so that it confers both
reputation-related and non-reputation-related advantage to those who use it.172 In these
cases, the ultimate competitive effect of allowing trademark rights may be difficult to
gauge: on the one hand, the reputational concerns may drive some purchasers mistakenly
to assume an affiliation between the parties and thereby increase search costs; but on the
other, the absence of competition may force consumers to pay a premium for the good,
even when many of them don’t particularly care whether the product was officially
licensed.
If the Supreme Court’s recent analysis of functionality is any guidance, the
170

Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 17 (1995) (“A design is functional” if it
“affords benefits in the manufacturing, marketing, or use of the goods or services with
which the design is used, apart from any benefits attributable to the design’s significance
as an indication of source, that are important to effective competition by others and that
are not practically available through the use of alternative designs.”) (emphasis added).

171
172

Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2001).
Wichita Falls, for example, may be one such case.
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solution in these cases should lie short of enjoining the mark. The Court has stated
unequivocally that functional features may not be protected under trademark law, even if
they have also come to indicate source.173 For features that actually help to make the
product work better, this is true without regard to their impact on competition.174 But
even for features that are “aesthetically functional,” the Court has suggested that
competitors must have access to the feature if the alternative would leave competitors at a
disadvantage beyond that attributable to reputation.175
None of this suggests an open season on the use of trademarks on merchandise.
As discussed above, there may be occasions in which such use will create confusion that
could affect the trademark holder’s reputation and cannot be dispelled with a
disclaimer.176 Even in other cases involving sponsorship rather than source confusion,
the particular usage at issue may imply the kind of official sponsorship that justifies
judicial relief. Claims of official sponsorship are clearly not functional; the advantage
they confer comes exclusively through reputational concerns rather than aesthetic or
communicative ones. But in other instances, the functionality doctrine suggests that the
public should have the benefit of competition in the sale of products that they desire,
including products whose primary aesthetic feature constitutes a trademark. If – and only
if – such competition risks creating misperceptions as to whether the trademark holder

173

TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33 (“Functionality having been established, whether MDI’s dual
spring design has acquired secondary meaning need not be considered.”).
174

Id.

175

See, e.g., Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 169-70; TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33 (aesthetic functionality
turns on whether the feature confers a substantial advantage unrelated to reputation).

176

Post-sale confusion is an example, as is the use of logos on items related to the
trademark holder’s primary market. See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
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endorsed the product, the solution lies in correcting those misperceptions through
disclaimers and corrective advertising, and not through enjoining use of the mark.
The Supreme Court’s recent zeal for competition in trademark cases thus lends
both theoretical and doctrinal muscle to the cause against a merchandising right. At the
very least, the Court’s recent decisions discredit the notion that a merchandising right can
exist without any showing of confusion or other search-cost-related harm. But they may
go further:

the Court’s repeated emphasis on the importance of competition and

consumer interests suggests that when a trademark is integral to the appeal of a good or
class of goods, competitors should be allowed to sell it, as long as they make their
unofficial status clear.

IV. Conclusion
While trademark owners, competitors, and perhaps even consumers act as though
the merchandising theory is a fait accompli, where the courts are concerned it is
ultimately a rather fragile theory.

Judicial adoption of the theory has never been

universal or even widespread. And the Supreme Court seems to have a firm idea of what
trademark law is about, a vision that leaves no room for a merchandising right. It seems
likely, therefore, that courts considering merchandising claims in the future will not be
inclined to uphold them absent special circumstances.
We don’t believe this should be cause for alarm. The merchandising theory has
not been persuasive to courts in large measure because its justifications lack persuasive
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force. The arguments normally advanced for a merchandising right are circular and
ultimately rather empty. Most of the good a merchandising right might do can be
accomplished more directly using existing trademark doctrines such as post-sale
confusion. Thus, we would eliminate the presumption of a merchandising right and put
courts to the task of determining whether, under the circumstances, a particular use was
in fact likely to confuse consumers as to source. If not, the competitor ought to have
access to the mark as product without incurring the cost of labeling itself as an
“unofficial” product. If confusion is likely, a disclaimer will ordinarily resolve it. We
can imagine some circumstances in which the risk of post-sale confusion would justify an
injunction, but they will be the rare cases. Most cases of consumer confusion can be
solved without a merchandising right. And where there is no consumer confusion at all,
the assertion of a pure right to control use of a mark for no other reason than because it is
“mine” is at odds with trademark theory and good public policy. Consumers don’t need
it, the statute doesn’t support it, and we are well rid of it.
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